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ABSTRACT 
 
After Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, Ishii Shiro created Unit 731 and began testing 
biological weapons on unwilling human test subjects.  The history of Imperial Japan’s human 
experiments was one in which Ishii and Unit 731 was the principal actor, but Unit 731 operated 
in a much larger context.  The network in which 731 operated consisted of Unit 731 and all its 
sub-units, nearly every major Japanese university, as well as many people in Japan’s scientific 
and medical community, military hospitals, military and civilian laboratories, and the Japanese 
military as a whole.  Japan’s racist ultra-nationalist movement heavily influenced these 
institutions and people; previous historians have failed to view Japan’s human experiments in 
this context.  This thesis makes use of a combination of declassified United States government 
and military documents, including court documents and the interviews conducted during the Unit 
731 Exhibition that traveled Japan in 1993 and 1994, and then recorded by Hal Gold in his book, 
Unit 731 Testimony, along with a number of secondary sources as supporting material.  Each of 
these sources has informed this work and helped clarify that Unit 731 acted within a broader 
network of human experimentation and exploitation in a racist system, which normalized human 
atrocities. Attitudes of racism and superiority do not necessarily explain every action taken by 
Japanese military personnel and scientists, nor did every individual view their actions or the 
actions of their countrymen as morally correct, but it does help explain why these acts occurred.  
What enabled many Japanese scientists was the racist ideology of the ultra-nationalist movement 
in Japan.  
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NOTE ON NAMES 
 
 Names in Japan are not written the same way as in Western countries.  To reflect this, 
where possible, all names are written in their traditional order.  This is to say, a person’s family 
name is written first and the given name is written last.  For example, John Smith is Smith John.  
All effort has been made to maintain this naming convention.  This same order is used in the 
footnotes and bibliography where applicable.  Where individuals are introduced without a full 
name given, it is because they were omitted by the original source. 
 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The setting was World War II in Japanese occupied China, the date unspecified, and 
several Japanese Imperial Army doctors-in-training entered a room at an Imperial Army hospital 
in China.  A colonel and several others waited along with two Chinese prisoners.  The first was a 
big man, possibly a soldier, and the other a farmer.  Standing nearby were two operating tables, 
surgical instruments, and several nurses and doctors who oversaw the proceedings.  The large 
man slowly walked to one of the tables, showing no signs of fear though he likely knew what 
was about to happen.  The farmer refused to lie down when taken to another table.  A nurse 
spoke to him and said, “We’re using ether; it won’t hurt, so lie down.”1  Once the prisoners were 
under, the surgical operation began, yet neither man had anything medically wrong with him.  
The farmer died during the course of the operation and the big man was killed with an injection 
of anesthesia.  This story is not a work of fiction but an account from Yuasa Ken, one of the 
army doctors who were assigned to practice on the prisoners.  He does not mention why these 
men were chosen to be used as experimental material other than that they were captured by the 
Japanese army.  Using prisoners for experiments or surgical practice was not an abnormal 
occurrence and scenes like this played out across the Japanese Empire.  Yuasa mentions that the 
nurse who spoke to the farmer acted as if the event was normal and when he asked her about the 
operation later, she claimed not to remember, presumably because she had participated in so 
many vivisections.  He was not concerned with the morality of what he was doing.  Yuasa was 
more concerned with looking good and not getting his uniform dirty because he wanted "to look 
                                                 
1
 Yuasa Ken, “Army Doctor (Yuasa Ken)” in Unit 731: Testimony, Hal Gold (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 208. 
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sharp" in front of his superiors.
2
  He partly blames this attitude on his education, which he states 
was racist and militaristic.  Yuasa was educated in the principles of the ultra-nationalist 
movement in Japan of the early 20
th
 century.  These principles combined racism and militarism 
to produce men and women driven to commit crimes under the belief they were advancing 
Japan’s national goals.  Yuasa's story is not an isolated one, and in many cases ether and other 
types of anesthesia were not used, leaving many prisoners fully awake and aware during the 
operations.   
 Yuasa worked in an army hospital, which mainly treated wounded Japanese soldiers.  His 
story and other stories of similar practices suggest his actions were common.  In puppet state of 
Manchukuo, the now infamous Japanese biological warfare research unit led by General Ishii 
Shiro known as Unit 731 conducted similar training exercises on humans, most of whom were 
Manchurian and Chinese.
3
  The purpose of Unit 731 was to conduct research into the 
development and usage of biological and chemical weapons for the Japanese military in its quest 
to create an empire across Asia known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  Unit 731 
was not alone in conducting these experiments, as can be attested to by Yuasa Ken’s work at an 
army hospital unrelated to Unit 731.  Unit 731 and other similar units were a fully integrated part 
of Imperial Japan’s war machine.  The men and women who served in these units were educated 
in a racist ideology, which placed the Japanese nation and people above all others. The Emperor 
of Japan was seen as a living god, and any act committed in his service was justified.  Previous 
research of Japan’s human experiments has largely skipped over the role racism played in 
                                                 
2
 Yuasa, 208 
3
 Ibid, 204-214. 
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motivating military personnel and scientists to conduct experiments, yet racism played a central 
role in the push to develop biological weapons. 
Background 
In 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria after staging a fake Chinese 
attack called the Mukden Incident.  Manchuria was renamed Manchukuo and essentially, became 
a colony of Japan.
4
  Ishii began human experiments at a facility in Harbin called Beiyinhe shortly 
after the takeover of Manchukuo.
5
  Ishii remained at Beiyinhe until 1938 when his unit moved 
twenty-four kilometers south of Harbin to a facility known as Ping Fan.
6
  Ping Fan was the site 
of the majority of Ishii’s experiments.  The facility studied diseases such as bubonic plague, 
anthrax, syphilis, and toxins such as fugu toxin.
7
  Ping Fan also developed delivery systems for 
the biological weapons and tested these bombs at the nearby Anda airfield.  General Ishii Shiro, 
founder and leader of the Imperial Army biological warfare research Unit 731, was a flamboyant 
and arrogant man who was disposed to grandiose schemes and outlandish claims.  Often 
described as eccentric, yet highly intelligent and energetic, Ishii is viewed as the father of 
Japan’s biological weapons program for the role he played in pushing the high command to fund 
biological weapons research.  He was not the only person conducting experiments, as there were 
many other biological warfare research centers similar to Ishii’s Unit 731 
Ishii was accepted to the Medical Department of Kyoto Imperial University in April 1916.  
Here he quickly came to the attention of the senior professors who gave him research 
                                                 
4
 Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare in 1932 – 45 and the American Cover-up. 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 8-9. 
5
 Ibid, 27. 
6
 Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: The 
Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Inc., 1989), 18. 
7
 Harris, 82 
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assignments that were advanced for his age and training.  His quick mind was not exposed to a 
single structured class on medical ethics.
8
  In fact, medical ethics was not emphasized in Japan 
and most schools did not offer it as a course, nor was the Hippocratic Oath taken by graduating 
doctors.  Medical ethics was not taught in schools, according to Sheldon H. Harris, because it 
was assumed inherent and that students understood the purpose of becoming a doctor was to help 
people and do no harm.
9
  Instead, many of these young men were instilled with a very strong 
sense of nationalism and patriotic duty.  This led some scientists to believe that medicine should 
be used as a weapon to accomplish the goals of the country.  Along with this sense of 
nationalism came a strong sense of racial superiority, which was believed to be backed up by 
science.  In this era of rapid scientific discovery, science was king.  Like many of his fellow 
medical officers, Ishii was an ardent ultra-nationalist who believed he could use science and 
medicine to further Japan’s goals.10  Japan’s ultra-nationalist factions believed it was Japan’s 
rightful place to rule over Asia and that the Japanese were a sacred and pure race whose duty was 
to “liberate” other Asians from colonial rule.11 
Ishii had a strong desire to advance his position, and he did so often to the chagrin of 
others who considered him brash, pushy and arrogant.  Ishii violated social norms by fraternizing 
with those who were socially above his station.  Ishii was often seen with Araki Torasaburo, the 
president of Kyoto University where Ishii graduated as a medical doctor in 1920 at the age of 
twenty-eight.
12
  Ishii eventually married President Araki’s daughter and solidify his relationship 
                                                 
8
 Harris, 15. 
9
 Ibid.  Nazi doctors were administered the Hippocratic Oath, yet they also conducted human experiments. 
10
 Ibid, 14-15. 
11
 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Patheon Books, 1986), 289. 
12
 Williams and Wallace, 16-17. 
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with Kyoto’s medical school and research department.13  It was not long after he graduated that 
Ishii joined the army and was commissioned as a lieutenant.  In 1922, Ishii transferred to the 
First Army Hospital in Tokyo where he pursued research, which was his true passion, not 
general practice.
14
  During Ishii’s military career, he maintained the ties he had built at Kyoto 
University and other leading research institutes like Tokyo University.  He later used these 
universities as recruiting grounds to bring young scientists and doctors into his employ.
15
  Ishii’s 
connections within the Japanese university system were extensive thanks to his marriage and 
charismatic personality.
16
  This network of allies within the military and universities served Ishii 
later in life by allowing him to secure funding and personnel.  The universities and military 
provided the means to conduct his research but it was his ties to the ultra-nationalist movement 
in Japan that motivated his actions. 
Responsibility  
From 1931 until the closing days of World War II in 1945, Japanese scientists, soldiers, 
and civilians committed numerous and varied crimes against humanity, including murder, human 
experimentation, the use of humans for surgical practice, forced labor, and bayonet practice for 
soldiers, and often extended beyond those listed here.  The responsibility rests with the 
commanders above Ishii and deep into the structure of the Tokyo High Command.  Ishii's 
funding was such that he could not have been acting on his own or with only the aid of the 
Kwantung Army, the Japanese military force that occupied Manchukuo.  At the end of the war, 
there was a concerted effort by the Japanese government to disconnect the imperial family from 
                                                 
13
 Hal Gold. Unit 731: Testimony (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 23-24. 
14
 Harris, 15. 
15
 Ibid, 17-18. 
16
 Meguro Masahiko, “Pharmacist attached to the laboratory at Dalian” in Unit 731: Testimony, Hal Gold (Tokyo: 
Yenbooks, 1996), 243-244. 
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the actions of the Japanese military to protect the Emperor from prosecution, but eyewitness 
testimony states that an imperial prince, who was cousin to Emperor Hirohito, was present at 
tests involving humans.
17
  Some historians, such as Daniel Barenblatt, speculate that the Emperor 
may have been privy to what was going on in the camps.  Early in the investigation of Unit 731 
by the United States, one of Ishii’s top officers, named Naito Ryoichi, listed the Emperor at the 
top of the chain of command of Unit 731.  Most of the evidence for the Emperor’s involvement 
is circumstantial, such as the Emperor’s cousin, Prince Takeda, being present at field tests.  The 
Emperor’s youngest brother Mikasa watched films of bubonic plague bombs being loaded onto 
planes and dropped on Chinese civilian centers.
18
  Tojo Hideki, Prime Minister of Japan from 
1941 to 1944, also knew about the experiments, having been shown some of Ishii’s “home 
movies” for years.  Emperor Hirohito signed an order to expand Unit 731, however the order did 
not give a description of the unit’s activities so it is unclear if Hirohito knew what the unit was.19  
Because current evidence leaves room for doubt that Emperor Hirohito knew the purpose of Unit 
731, it cannot be stated unequivocally that the Emperor knew of Unit 731’s activities. 
The experiments performed by Unit 731 were not unique and there were many other units 
with varying degrees of independence from Unit 731 in the Japanese military that participated.  
Experiments took place all across the Japanese empire, with different degrees of frequency and 
scope.  Unit 731 was an example of large-scale, industrial experimentation with its smaller 
offshoots providing auxiliary support and conducting experiments of their own.  These industrial 
level experiments included testing poison gas on prisoners, conducting field experiments with 
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 Daniel Barenblatt,  A Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s Germ Warfare Operation  
(New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), 32-33 
18
 Ibid, 32-33. 
19
 Ibid, 37. 
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bubonic plague bombs, injecting horse blood into people, freezing limbs to test frostbite 
remedies, and many other experiments too numerous to list.  Many of the experiments took place 
in China and Manchukuo, but also at Imperial Navy hospitals on islands across the Pacific in 
using POWs for experiments and as surgical practice.
20
  Considering the secrecy of the Unit, 
Ishii made very little effort to hide his activities from the scientific community in Japan.  Ishii 
and many of his top scientists frequently published their findings in Japanese scientific 
journals.
21
  They could not help but share what they considered the cutting edge of medical 
science, such as the discovery of how diseases progressed through the bodies of the infected and 
how certain organs reacted.  In the articles, they often substituted the word monkey for human in 
a thinly veiled attempt to cover-up what they were doing.  However, in a normal scientific paper 
that detailed a legitimate experiment, the proper species name of the monkey was given.  Articles 
detailing human experiments did not provide species names.  This shows the active involvement 
of the scientific community of Japan because so many people from the various universities 
around Japan participated and many volunteered or requested assignment to a research unit so 
they could conduct experiments that would otherwise be difficult to do in Japan.   
As for the scientific community outside of Japan, it is difficult to gauge how much was 
known but it can be said that the rest of the world was mostly unaware of Japan’s human 
experiment activities until World War II.  Many scientists, politicians, and military strategists in 
the West believed that the Japanese were incapable of making any meaningful scientific 
advancement as the Japanese were seen as an inferior race.  The Japanese wanted to maintain the 
secrecy of their research to keep the outside world unaware of what they were doing, because if 
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 Barenblatt, 70-71. 
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people knew Japan was preparing biological and chemical weapons, then other countries would 
build up defenses and weapons of their own, potentially negating any advances Japan might have 
made.   
From 1931 until 1945, Ishii and his unit conducted their experiments along with many 
other units, such as Unit 100, Unit 200, Unit Ei 1644, Unit 516, and other units whose 
designations are still unknown.  Unit 731 was one large cog in a larger machine and the human 
experiments they conducted were common throughout the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.  To the Japanese military, civilians and POWs were tools to be used and discarded.  The 
“precious human material,” as Ishii was oft to refer to them, were medical samples waiting to be 
harvested.  Japanese companies, both in Japan and elsewhere in the Japanese empire, shared the 
same racist attitudes towards non-Japanese who were worked to death in forced labor operations.  
For Imperial Japan, the people of China and Manchukuo were there to be exploited and to serve 
the master Japanese race.  Even Japanese were exploited.  For example, it was the duty of 
Japanese soldiers to die for the emperor and the duty of the people of East Asia to be completely 
subservient to Japan.  The story of Japan’s experiments is a human one, yet few Japanese 
soldiers, doctors, and civilians were willing to share their experiences.  These interviews are 
some of the most important pieces of primary documentation available.  They present us with 
depth and emotion that is hard to grasp in figures and charts, and are some of the only surviving 
firsthand accounts of what happened since the Japanese left almost none of their victims alive. 
The story presented at the beginning of this introduction was an ordinary scenario for one 
military hospital and Yuasa Ken noted the ease with which the nurse smiled at a man who was 
about to be murdered.  He comments that it was so easy for her to do this because he believed 
9 
 
she had done it so many times before.  Ultra-nationalism provided the motivation for many of 
Japan’s crimes, but racism provided the justification.  Anything done in the name of the Emperor 
was good.  The Japanese were the sacred Yamato race, destined to rule Asia and subjugate all 
non-Japanese.  Under this atmosphere, it became possible to commit crimes against humanity. 
The United States 
The Tokyo High Command was well aware of the activities of Unit 731 and its 
subsidiaries, a fact that eluded one of the first American investigators after the war, Lieutenant 
Colonel Murray Sanders.
22
  However, before these investigations, the United States knew Japan 
had been conducting experiments with biological and chemical weapons, although the full extent 
of the experiments was not known.  By 1946, the United States had received several reports that 
experiments may have been conducted on Allied prisoners of war by Unit 100 and Unit 731.
23
  In 
1946, a letter was sent to General Douglas MacArthur stating that experiments were conducted 
on three Allied prisoners of war at the Infectious Disease Research Laboratory in Tokyo.
24
  One 
anonymous youth corps member, who worked at the Unit 731 subunit of Unit 200, later 
described his job preserving human specimens in Formalin.  There were specimens of adults, 
children and babies, heads, organs, and entire bodies.  He also recalled that they were separated 
by nationality and that he saw “Chinese, Russians, Koreans, Britons, Frenchmen, and 
Americans.”25  This is only one example of Americans used for experiments, as there are several 
court cases, which also describe the experimentation and murder of several United States 
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 Harris, 181. 
23
 William H. Cunliffe. Select Documents on Japanese War Crimes and Japanese Biological Warfare, 1934-2006. 
(Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration), JWC 231/10, pg 35 and JWC 2288/8a, pg 36. 
24
 Ibid, JWC 258/18, pg 39 
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 Anonymous, “Youth Corps member (Anonymous)” in Unit 731: Testimony, Hal Gold (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 
169-170. 
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military personnel.  USA vs. Iwanami Hiroshi et al. and USA vs. Asano Shimpei et al. were part 
of the Class B and C war crimes tribunals, which were held in nations across the Pacific after 
World War II.  In the case of Iwanami, he beheaded some of the Americans he was accused of 
murdering, boiling the heads and sending the skulls back to Tokyo as specimens for study.
26
  
Connections were not made to Unit 731 during these trials, either because of a lack of due 
diligence during the investigative process or because it was officially suppressed.  It is now well 
documented by historians such as Daniel Barenblatt, William and Wallace, Sheldon Harris, and 
many others that the United States actively suppressed knowledge of Japan’s human experiments 
and activities in biological warfare, particularly activities surrounding Unit 731.
27
  This was not 
the first time the United States suppressed knowledge of human experiments as they had already 
captured many Nazi scientists and brought them back to the US to work on various projects such 
as the building of American rockets.  Nor would the human experiments have shocked the US 
government as they had been conducting human experiments since 1922 and continued to do so 
for many years after the war.
28
 
Because of the cover-up, few who committed crimes in the name of science were 
prosecuted.  Ishii died from cancer in 1959 and was never prosecuted for his crimes.  Many other 
high-ranking officers in the various units went back to Japan, re-entered the university system, 
and played prominent roles in Japan’s medical and academic community.  Unlike their victims, 
most of these men and women went on to live full lives, and were exposed only after many years 
of silence or after many of the perpetrators had died of old age or were nearing the end of their 
                                                 
26
 USA vs. Iwanami Hiroshi et al. Navy Case 48-35-1 Part 1 (JAG, 1947) 
www.fold3.com (accessed February 27, 2013).  The skulls of the American’s in this case were never recovered. 
27
 Cunliffe, JWC, 257/6, 43. 
28
 Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945-1990 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 157. 
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lives.  For the United States government, the emerging conflict with the Soviet Union 
outweighed the need for justice.  The US tried very hard to keep the Soviets from gaining access 
to the men of Unit 731.  The Soviets did capture some Unit 731 personnel who were trying to 
flee Manchukuo.
29
  Many of these men stood trial in Khabarovsk Trials held in the city of 
Khabarovsk in the Soviet Union.  At the time of the trials, the United States stated the trials were 
just propaganda.
30
 
Rooted in Racism 
Research on Nazi Germany’s crimes by other historians has been thorough and the 
numbers of books written about the subject are too many to list here.  However, Germany’s 
human experiments deserve to be brought to attention since they occurred at around the same 
time Ishii was conducting his experiments.  Dr. Josef Mengele is one of the best-known 
criminals of Nazi Germany who conducted medical experiments on people and aided in the 
slaughter of millions of innocents, although his research was more concerned with scientific 
curiosity.  Mengele used humans for his own purposes although the overriding theme of the Nazi 
scientific community’s experiment on humans was race.  For Adolf Hitler, German doctors who 
could provide his ideology with what were believed to be scientific facts were some of the best 
allies he found for who would question the word of a trained doctor.  Arguments backed by 
science made the Nazis extremely effective at spreading their racist ideology.  The Nazis 
understood the faith people put in science along with a pervasive prejudice against Jews in an 
attempt to realize their goal of exterminating people considered inferior.  Racism was not a Nazi 
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phenomenon, nor was the faith placed in science unique to Germany.  This atmosphere of racism 
had pervaded many countries in Europe, the United States and Japan since before World War I. 
Japan had a racist view of non-Japanese and they used this to justify the creation of the 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” a program of empire building.  Under this 
hierarchical system, Japan would be the ruler of Asia.  Like most Nazis scientists, many Unit 731 
scientists were ultra-nationalists and this influenced their thinking and justification for the crimes 
they committed.  One finds a deep lack of morality amongst many of the top scientists and those 
who did have reservations lost such fleeting feelings of shame as they became accustomed to 
murder.
31
  For the Japanese of this period, people of other races were seen as inferior.  The 
Japanese often referred to themselves as the Yamato race, a name that originates out of a belief 
that a region in central Japan, known as Yamato, was the mythical birthplace of the Japanese 
people.  Japanese racism presented itself in a different way, which can often make it hard to 
recognize for outsiders who are used to Western racism.  The West portrayed the Japanese as 
monkeys or with very apelike features.
32
  Non-whites were viewed as animalistic, and the darker 
one’s skin was the more primitive the people were.  Just as the West viewed it as their burden to 
civilize other cultures, so too did the Japanese viewed it necessary to civilize other Asians by 
introducing Japanese culture and language. 
The Japanese took a different approach in their ideas of racism.  Their notion was in 
some ways more subtle, with non-Japanese described as unclean or impure, often in a spiritual 
sense.  The Japanese viewed themselves as being above other Asians who constituted the vast 
majority of their victims from 1931 to 1945.  These notions of uncleanliness worked themselves 
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into the Japanese language through religion and in the Japanese creation myths.  Many Japanese 
at the time believed the gods created the Yamato race and therefore divine.
33
  This meant that 
purity was defined by the color of one’s soul and not skin color.  Red represented life and the 
soul, and the color of the Japanese soul was red.
34
  The shedding of blood was therefore a way to 
purge oneself of corruption.  This kind of rhetoric was nearly impossible to escape as its 
symbolism was imbedded in the Japanese language, with words like “sekisei” (sincerity), 
literally meaning “red truth,” (the ideograph for red being, seki).35  The Japanese flag is a red sun 
upon a white background, the white representing purity and the red sun being the Japanese 
people.
36
  It is not the blunt racism of the West where the animalistic nature of the “other” 
dominated the rhetoric.  It was a more subtle sort of racism, where the “other” was a person who 
existed within a divinely codified existence of subservience and only the restoration of what was 
viewed as the natural social order could bring peace and harmony.   
Conclusion 
 Unit 731 and Ishii Shiro were instrumental to Japan’s biological warfare research 
program, but so were the other units, which conducted experiments separate from Ishii, some 
more independent than others did.  Universities were vital to the research efforts of every 
biological warfare research unit, they supplied the scientists and the knowledge, and many of 
those scientists were not part of the military but civilian employees who worked for the military.  
Many volunteered to go to an Ishii unit in the hopes it would further their career or allow for 
research that was not as easy to do in Japan.  While not as common as in Manchukuo and China, 
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some experiments were conducted in Japan.  There are at least three known cases of human 
experiments conducted in Japan and there were likely more that are unknown.  Specimens taken 
from the murdered victims of experiments were regularly sent back to Japan where many have 
remained since the war, buried or disposed of in some other way.  Videos of experiments were 
shown at the universities to students and those same students were taught that medicine was a 
weapon to be used by Japan in its quest for empire. 
 Unit 731 and Ishii existed within the larger context of Imperial Japan’s war machine.  It 
included many facets of society from universities, laboratories, and civilian scientists along with 
the many other biological and chemical weapons military research units, pharmaceutical 
companies and military hospitals across the Japanese Empire participating in human 
experimentation and exploitation.  The crimes were committed in an environment of pervasive 
racism towards non-Japanese in the belief that the Yamato race was the rightful rulers of Asia.  
Each race served a specific function and only when everyone was in his or her designated place 
under Japanese rule could there be harmony.  Japan’s human experiments from 1931 to 1945 
must be placed within the full context of Imperial Japan’s ultra-nationalist movement of the early 
20
th
 century.  Proving the motivations of each individual scientist is impossible, but it is possible 
to highlight the racist philosophy under which they operated.  This philosophy spurred the 
scientists to develop weapons to help the nation succeed in its goal of conquering Asia.  
Biological weapons can be powerful for the lives they can take and the fear they can instill.  
Combine this desire with a lack of sympathy for people considered non-human and the results 
are plain to see in the stories of the victims of the human experiments.  What drove many 
15 
 
Japanese scientists to conduct human experiments was the racist ideology of the ultra-nationalist 
movement in Japan. 
  
16 
 
II. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 The history of the criminal human experimentation committed by the Japanese in China 
and Manchukuo is short and understudied compared to other histories, nor is it an easy subject to 
study as much of the evidence has been destroyed, lost, or hidden.  It was not until relatively 
recently that many of the documents the United States government had compiled on the subject 
became declassified.  In the post war years, these crimes were forgotten as the American 
government covered up what the Japanese did in order to secure any important scientific data 
Japan held.  Peter Williams and David Wallace, two journalists, conducted one of the first non-
governmental investigations into Japan’s human experiment activities after a Japanese student at 
Keio University discovered a box containing documents detailing a human experiment.
37
  They 
first made a televised documentary, which shocked the world by exposing what the Japanese had 
done.  After the TV documentary, they wrote a book about the experiments and subsequent 
cover-up.  Their book focused almost exclusively on Ishii Shiro and Unit 731, and the cover-up 
by the United States and Japan, which followed the war.  Its place in the historiography is as one 
of the first works about Japan’s human experiments in the West and its importance is the 
exposure it gave to the subject.  Japan’s human experiment activities was a subject familiar to the 
Chinese, but was a topic covered up and ignored by those in the West.  Before any historian 
could delve into the details of the activities, the mindset of the perpetrators, the reasons men and 
women were capable of committing such atrocities, and the other debates and activities which 
historians carry out, it was first necessary to simply figure out what happened and on what scale 
the activities of Unit 731 were carried out.  Williams and Wallace started this process and 
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opened the door for later historians to truly put Japan’s human experiment activities under the 
rigor of professional historical scrutiny. 
The historian Sheldon Harris took the investigation further and gave it the methodical 
treatment of a historian.  His work was some of the most important and groundbreaking in this 
particular field because of the depth of his study and the exposure he gave to the broader network 
of research facilities.  He exposed the West to the discovery made by the Chinese scholar Han 
Xiao of the facility at Beiyinhe and showed it was some of the earliest work done by Ishii on 
humans.
38
  This confirmed to scholars in the west that the Japanese began experiments almost 
immediately after entering Manchukuo.
39
  Harris also brought Unit 100 and Unit Ei 1640 into the 
spotlight.  Other units were discussed in his work, Factories of Death, a book that remains one of 
the most comprehensive and important studies on the subject.  In 1993 and 1994, the Unit 731 
Exhibition traveled around Japan with the purpose of educating the public on what had been 
done and collecting interviews of people who participated in or had knowledge of the crimes of 
Unit 731.  Hal Gold collected these interviews into his book, Unit 731: Testimony.
40
  These 
interviews are a stark, harsh and brutal example of the crimes carried out.  Often in a very 
matter-of-fact way, they describe the brutal deaths of many innocent people.  They are also a 
reminder that the men who were in charge of and committed these crimes went unpunished.  The 
cover-up which followed the war did not completely hide what had happened.  It was effective in 
suppressing discussion in the United States but it did not keep researchers in China and Japan 
from discovering what had happened.   
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Sheldon Harris acquired an English translation of The Bacteriological Warfare Unit and 
the Suicide of Two Physicians, by Tsuneishi Kei’ichi and Asano Tomizo published in 1982.  
Harris relied on Tsuneishi and Asano’s book throughout his work.41  Another important yet 
somewhat controversial work was The Devil’s Gluttony, by Morimura Seiichi.42  Morimura’s 
book was one of fiction based on extensive research, but Harris hinted that Morimura’s book had 
some factual errors in.
43
  Morimura’s work was important for opening discussion in Japan during 
the 1980s because it forced the Japanese government to admit for the first time that Unit 731 
existed.  Tsuneishi Kei’ichi also wrote another book called The Germ Warfare Unit That 
Disappeared.
44
  Harris made use of this book because he was able to obtain a special translated 
copy from Mr. Norman Covert.
45
  There are also books written in Chinese that were 
unobtainable, including one called Unit 731: Japanese germ warfare Unit in China (侵华日军关
东军七三一细菌部队).  These works represent an important aspect of the historiography that 
unfortunately cannot be delved into here because translated versions could not be obtained.  It is 
important to remember that these works exist and have greatly influenced the study of Japan’s 
human experiments in the West and many of the advances made in the United States on this 
subject owe their existence to these seminal works of history. 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon’s article, “Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World 
War II Experience,” largely deals with the study of chemical weapons.  The article was written 
during the Cold War when the threat of World War III was a real possibility.  Conventional 
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wisdom stated that World War III would be fought with nuclear weapons, but Moon saw a 
different future.  For this, he looks at World War II.  Moon states that many believed World War 
II would open with or devolve into the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons on a massive 
scale.
46
  Chemical weapons were used extensively on Chinese soldiers and civilians, but were not 
used on a large scale against major combatants, such as the United States, at any time during the 
war.  Moon’s article seeks to explain why such weapons did not see use, even in the closing days 
of the war.  During the early part of the World War II, the initiative was with the Axis powers.  
Germany was rolling across Western Europe and the Japanese were making very quick gains in 
the Pacific, achieving many early victories against the United States and her allies.  Such gains 
would only be hampered by the use of chemical weapons or biological weapons.  Neither of 
these unconventional weapons discerns between friend and foe, and has the potential to linger in 
an area for days, weeks and months.  The German blitzkrieg moved too fast to make this 
effective and Japan was advancing rapidly from island to island, crushing most resistance 
quickly and ruthlessly.  Another reason was the overestimation of the capabilities of the Allied 
powers’ chemical weapons capabilities.  Japan and Germany both believed that if they used 
chemical weapons, retaliation would be swift and profound.  For Germany, the use of chemical 
weapons had another side.  Moon points out that Hitler was wounded in a gas attack during 
World War I and this may explain his opposition to its use throughout World War II.
47
  The 
German high command was also strongly opposed to its use except in retaliation.  Most of those 
in the German government who strongly advocated chemical weapons use were ideologues such 
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as Robert Ley, Martin Bormann, and Joseph Goebbels.
48
  The Germans had reasons that are 
more practical as well.  As previously stated, the use of chemical weapons during blitzkrieg 
would have only hindered the advance of German forces, and by the time the Germans might 
have been tempted to use chemical weapons out of desperation in the closing days of the war it 
was too late for such weapons to make a difference.  Later in the war, Germany lost its air 
superiority and would have been at the mercy of Allied reprisal and the destruction of German 
industrial centers made manufacture of the necessary agents and components for delivery 
difficult at best.
49
 
Japan had not developed its chemical weapons program to the extent that the Germans 
had or to the extent it needed for sustained operations, though the Japanese had used them 
against the Chinese to great effect because the Chinese had little defense against chemical 
weapons and no way to retaliate in kind.  The Japanese also lost their air superiority later in the 
war and would have been at the mercy of Allied reprisal.  However, Moon believes the command 
to use chemical and biological weapons would have come from a group called the choken shoko, 
which was composed of executive military officers who anonymously made decisions on a 
consensus basis.
50
  General Tojo tried to tell allied investigators that the decision to use or not 
use chemical weapons was his own to make, but this was unlikely.  More likely, it was the fact 
that Japan’s intelligence community was convinced that America would not use chemical 
weapons except in retaliation and they also recognized America’s superiority in chemical 
weapons.  They did not wish to give the United States an excuse to use such weapons.
51
  The 
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United States did not use chemical weapons because of strong public opinion against it and out 
of fear of reprisal on population centers, particularly in Britain.  Its potential did tempt military 
planners who saw how effective it might be for rooting the fanatical Japanese warriors out of 
their caves after it was seen how deadly effective the Japanese were when dug into strong 
positions exemplified by the battles of Iwo Jima, Tarawa, and Okinawa.  Moon’s study of 
motivation is an important one for understanding why World War II did not turn into a “chemical 
weapons apocalypse.”52 
Peter Williams and David Wallace wrote Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in 
World War II after a televised investigation into the activities of Unit 731.  As the authors stated, 
their book was not a continuation in written format of their televised documentary but a much 
more thorough investigation into how much the United States knew about Unit 731 and its 
subsequent cover up of Unit 731 and Unit 100’s activities.  It is also an important exposé on the 
activities of Unit 731, as many people in the West were completely unaware that the unit existed.  
There was little to no work done on Unit 731 by Western historians prior to Williams and 
Wallace, and their book was the beginning of the historiographical process in US and Europe.  
The book begins with a discussion on what sort of experiments these units carried out and the 
attempt to weaponize biology, followed by what the Allies knew of these activities.  Ishii and his 
men fooled initial investigators, such as Lieutenant Colonel Murray Sanders.   
Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II is not simply about a 
United States cover-up, but suggests that almost every Allied country was aware of the 
experiments Japan had been conducting in Manchukuo and that some experiments may have 
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involved Allied personnel as experimental material.  The book shows MacArthur was privy to 
information about these investigations and it is clear that he ordered evidence of human 
experiments kept quiet and that the men responsible should not be tried.
53
  The book also 
suggests that the reason the Soviet Union was so determined to convict war criminals for 
biological weapons experiments was that it was trying to cover up its own human experiment 
activities.
54
 The last part of the book ends with a discussion of the consequences that followed 
during the Korean War and the wider Cold War.  The book examines the similarities between the 
way German war criminals were not prosecuted and the way Japanese war criminals were 
prosecuted (or not prosecuted).  This was important for later historical works because it 
highlighted that the United States was interested in protecting German and Japanese scientists in 
the hopes of gaining useful information.  The authors failed to realize many Nazi scientists were 
given immunity similar to the Japanese scientists.   This book was one of the earliest full-length 
public investigations into Japan’s biological weapons and chemical weapons programs written in 
English.  What it brought to the field was a wealth of sources unknown to Western historians, 
many derived from United States government documents previously unavailable.  The book is an 
exposé, not a work that addresses other historians.  Its place in Western historiography is that it 
sparked interest in a topic, which was ignored, or unknown for many years after World War II.   
 Sheldon Harris’ book Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare in 1932 – 45 and 
the American Cover-up, takes a much closer focus on Ishii Shiro.  Harris presents Ishii as the 
driving force behind Japan’s biological weapons research, which really formed into a 
recognizable program in 1932.  Ishii was portrayed as a charismatic and highly intelligent 
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individual who was able to use his powerful personality to get the funding he needed in order to 
conduct biological weapons research.  Ishii is also labeled the mastermind behind Japan’s 
biological weapons program.  Others were involved and Harris makes it clear that Ishii could not 
have had the money to fund his experiments and build his facilities without the help of powerful 
people in the Tokyo High Command.  It was Ishii’s personality, which enabled him to gain 
access to these people and convince them that biological warfare was worth researching.  His 
Ping Fan facility was his crowning achievement and could not have been built without massive 
amounts of money.  His budget in 1936 was an annual sum of ten million yen and possibly 
more.
55
  Harris states that generals commanding several army divisions were not receiving as 
much while Ishii was merely a Lieutenant Colonel at the time he secured this budget.
56
  Ishii was 
also tied to the very powerful nationalist movement within the Japanese officer corps.  Ishii was 
described as vehement nationalist and this, along with his personality, helped him gain access to 
the people who could provide him funds.   Harris presents some new material, such as the first 
examination of the facility at Beiyinhe where Ishii conducted his first human experimentation.  
Beiyinhe was the early prototype for Ping Fan.
57
   
As the book’s title suggests, Factories of Death is about the various facilities where 
experiments were carried out, so Harris also looks at Unit 100 and its facility at Changchun and 
the facility at Nanking.  This is important as Harris presents Manchukuo as one giant testing 
ground for biological weapons activity.  He also discusses testing carried out in other parts of 
China.  This assertion was supported by Hal Gold’s book where one soldier describes becoming 
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aware that biological weapons attacks were being quietly carried out on villages across China.  
One of the units Harris talks about that had not received much attention prior to his work was 
Unit 100.  Unit 100 was a semi-autonomous unit under Unit 731, which was based near 
Changchun, a large city much like Harbin, in a suburb known as Mokotan.  The unit was led by 
Major Wakamatsu Yujiro, an obscure veterinarian who eventually rose to the rank of Major 
General in the Kwantung Army Veterinary Service.
58
  While the bulk of testing done at Unit 100 
was geared toward biological weapons against animals and crops, the unit also conducted 
experiments on thousands of people.  The exact number of people killed is unknown.  Farmers in 
the area later reported discovering human corpses, near the Unit 100 headquarters, in a five 
hundred meter long area that was at least two to five meters deep.  Estimates from this discovery 
do not count the number of people burned in the facility’s incinerator.  Unlike Unit 731, at least 
one report from a non-Japanese is available despite access being severely limited.  One boy, Li 
Ye Guang, who was going to graduate from an Army supply school in Changchun, was taken to 
the camp with his classmates as part of a field trip to study different army operations.
59
  Here 
they were shown some of the facility’s experiments on animals, such as a demonstration on a 
horse that was killed from an unknown injection.  Unit 100 also conducted field tests near 
Changchun and when the unit had to flee at the end of the war, they released plague, glanders, 
and anthrax into the surrounding areas. This last act caused at least three major outbreaks in 1946, 
1947, and 1951, and left some areas uninhabitable until the mid-1950s.
60
  Li Ye Guang’s report 
is one of the only from non-Japanese known to exist concerning Japan’s human experiments.  
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Harris deals little with historiography.  He does use books from Japanese and Chinese historians, 
but these are as source material and do not provide an account of historiographical progress.  
Harris’ book is one of the first major works by a Western historian and he deals little with 
historiography.  As with Williams and Wallace’s book, Harris’ book was more shedding light on 
a little known event.   
 Hal Gold’s Unit 731: Testimony is perhaps most important for the first-hand testimonies 
that makes up about half his book.  He examines the consequences of Unit 731’s actions and 
discusses what became of many of the scientists and participants, something Williams and 
Wallace had not done in detail and something Harris did not cover in depth either.  Gold 
provides a list of men who worked for Unit 731 and other units, what they did during the war and 
what they did after the war.  Some of these scientists were very successful after the war, like 
three Unit 731 men who founded the Green Cross, a pharmaceutical company.  They were Naito 
Ryoichi, who worked on bacteriological research, Kitano Masaji, who conducted frostbite 
research, and Futagi Hideo, who was a vivisection team leader.
61
  All three men were active in 
human experiments and all three participated in vivisections.  The most revealing evidence given 
in the book and the biggest contribution to the historiography are the personal accounts given by 
people who were actually working within the various biological/chemical weapons units.  Some 
of the testimony was from soldiers who guarded Ping Fan, doctor’s assistants, several nurses, 
and Ishii Shiro’s driver who recounts having to run over people with a truck because they were 
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trying to escape a field test.
62
  It is evident from the testimonies that experimentation was not the 
only way people were killed by Unit 731 because some were murdered for fun.  
One member of the Japanese Youth Corp, an organization comparable to the Hitler Youth, 
who worked for Unit 731 claimed to have worked in the section where specimens were 
preserved, sometimes whole human bodies were preserved and other times just parts.  The 
nationality, sex, age, and date and time of death were labeled on specimens of complete bodies.  
This member, who preferred to remain anonymous, states that not only were Chinese, Russians, 
and Koreans present, but also Americans, Britons, and Frenchmen.
63
  Included among the 
individuals preserved were children and babies.
64
  In a way, Unit 731 was involved with other 
seemingly unrelated tasks as well.  The anonymous Youth Corp member also claims that 
kamikaze pilots departing on suicide missions drank saké (rice wine) laced with a stimulant 
developed by Unit 731.  Another account given is a bit different because it is actually a lecture 
given by Nishino Rumiko, who was an important researcher of comfort women.  Comfort 
women were women used by the Japanese military as unwilling prostitutes.  In this lecture, she 
describes interviews done with personnel from Unit 731.  Previous works do not mentioned Unit 
731 experiments involving comfort women, and the research and experiments the unit did on 
venereal diseases.  One example of such an experiment was where they forced an individual with 
syphilis to have sex with someone who did not.  This was usually done at gunpoint and for 
infecting the person for study because it was found that injecting syphilis was ineffective for 
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research and that the best way to study it was if the disease was contracted “naturally.”65  
Technicians and doctors from the unit were also charged with giving comfort women venereal 
disease examinations and this is corroborated by the anonymous Youth Corp member who 
participated in the examinations.  Gold’s list of personal accounts is extremely important as they 
are eyewitness testimonies that can be used to back up other research, which was not available to 
other historians in the quantities Gold was able to collect them thanks to the Unit 731 
Exhibition.
66
  The firsthand accounts of the aforementioned individuals will be very important 
for this research paper as they can be used to confirm previous research and evidence found 
within other documents.  They provide details, which are often lacking from more “official” 
sources, especially considering that there are few Chinese eyewitnesses because most were killed.  
Gold’s book is centered on the interviews he compiled and only gives a cursory examination of 
Unit 731 in contrast to Harris’ work, which is very detailed.  Gold does not provide any 
discussion of previous historians but seeks to separate itself by providing a wealth of first-person 
accounts.  This makes the book more important as a source than as a corpus of historiographical 
change. 
 A Plague Upon Humanity, by Daniel Barenblatt, can be seen as a continuation of Harris’ 
and Gold’s work.  However, Barenblatt’s work draws some sharper conclusions about Unit 731 
than many other books before it.  Barenblatt makes a much stronger case for the Emperor’s 
knowledge of Ishii’s human experiments.  Such evidence includes Prince Takeda, the Emperor’s 
cousin, and Prince Mikasa, the Emperor’s youngest brother being shown films of bubonic plague 
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bombs being loaded onto planes and dropped on Chinese civilian centers.  Barenblatt also states 
that Prince Mikasa wrote in his memoirs that he was shown “films where large numbers of 
Chinese prisoners of war brought by cargo trains were made to march on the Manchurian plain 
for poison gas experimentation.”67  Tojo Hideki had knowledge of the experiments as he was 
shown films Ishii made of the experiments.  After watching the films for several years, Tojo 
began to find them “unpleasant,” and stopped watching them.68 Further support for the 
Emperor’s knowledge of the unit is the fact that the Emperor authorized the expansion and 
official integration into the Kwantung Army of Unit 731, also known as the Togo Unit, in 
1936.
69
  The final piece of evidence presented by Barenblatt is that Emperor Hirohito was a 
biologist, who wrote peer reviewed scientific papers on sea slugs.  Sea slugs seem a far cry from 
human experimentation but as Barenblatt states, it would seem highly unusual that the Emperor 
was kept in the dark about Unit 731’s activities.70  The evidence presented to prove Hirohito’s 
involvement is circumstantial at best and therefore does not constitute proof. 
A Plague Upon Humanity is also a book about accountability.  This is the major theme 
throughout Barenblatt’s book.  This separates it from Factories of Death, which largely tries to 
explain the magnitude of what happened.  Barenblatt seeks to not just provide an account of 
events, but to put blame on the shoulders of all those involved.  It is through culpability that he 
engages previous works from Harris, Gold, and others.  He presents a new context from which to 
examine the subject by trying to identify all the responsible parties.  Where his work falls short is 
providing the proper context of the rise of racism and the pseudo-science of eugenics in the early 
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20
th
 century and how powerful an influence such ideologies had on otherwise normal individuals.  
Many of these men were brought up in a society, which viewed Japan as the rightful rulers of 
Asia and believed in the concept of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of which the Japanese 
would be at the top.  Any actions taken to further this goal or any actions taken against those 
considered lesser were therefore morally acceptable and naturally correct with everyone in their 
“proper place.”71 
  Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative inquiries in science, history, and 
ethics, edited by Arthur Kleinman, Jing-Bao Nie, and Mark Selden, was compiled from many 
different authors and has been included last in this list because it takes a sharp turn from the rest 
of the books discussed here.  In some ways, it is perhaps the most groundbreaking of all the 
books in that it forces one to take in the entirety of Japan’s human experiments.  Other books 
have presented Unit 731 and Ishii Shiro as the main perpetrators of human experiments, with 
other, smaller, units participating in support of the main operation at Ping Fan.  Kleinman, Nie, 
and Selden show in their compendium that Unit 731 was just a large cog in a much larger 
machine of human suffering and the crimes extended well beyond the military sphere and into 
the civilian and academic sphere.  They also try to explain the motivations of the scientists who 
participated.  Some scientists sought recognition or simply wanted to do things they had never 
been allowed before and this led them to willingly seek out Ishii and the other units.  Universities 
hosted the lectures Ishii gave, they sent resources and scientists, and they received specimens and 
provided a platform for Ishii to present his studies.  Experiments were not limited to the Imperial 
Army but were also performed by the Imperial Navy and not just on civilians, but on POWs, a 
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practice that was likely fairly common considering the ease with which they were performed by 
two separate officers on different occasions.
72
 Along with these revelations are the discussions of 
the involvement of pharmaceutical companies who requested and received body parts, organs, 
and other human samples, which were taken from POWs and civilians by the Japanese army and 
navy to be shipped back to Japan.  Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative inquiries 
in science, history, and ethics provides a major historiographical switch from trying to explain 
what happened to trying to explain why it happened.   
One of the major themes in the historiography of Japan’s human experiments in China is 
culpability.  This was a natural progression, as justice was never fully served for those 
responsible for some of the most reprehensible crimes of World War II.  Thousands upon 
thousands died in experiments carried out by men who were not held responsible.  It therefore 
became more necessary to point out the crimes of these men.  Ishii Shiro died in 1959 of cancer, 
but other men such as Kitano Masaji, Futagi Hideo, and Naito Ryoichi went on to become 
prominent members of society.  Hal Gold lists at least nineteen men who were important 
participants in the human experiments at the various units across China and who later became 
prominent members of society.  Not all of these people belonged to the military, some of them 
were civilian personnel who worked for the military research units, such as Amitani Shogo who 
helped the Ishii units by working at Tokyo University Laboratory for Communicable Diseases 
and remained at this post after the war and he eventually received the Asahi Prize “for 
outstanding scientific performance.”73  Another man, Tanaka Hideo, worked with the team who 
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conducted research on plague-carrying fleas which were considered one of the most effective 
means of infection and with which many human experiments were conducted.  He went on to be 
dean of the faculty of medicine at Osaka City University.
74
 
 How far up the chain of command, the blame for what happened goes has been one of the 
great debates in the field.  Harris makes a compelling case that certain members within the 
Tokyo High Command had direct knowledge of what was going on, for it was inconceivable to 
imagine that Ishii could have secured all the funding, equipment, and academic connections 
without support.  There is also some evidence that Emperor Hirohito knew what was going on.  
There are connections between the Ishii units and at least one member of the imperial family, 
Takeda no Miya, who was an imperial prince and cousin of Emperor Hirohito, having been 
present at testing, as well as the fact that he controlled the funds for the Kwantung Army and 
therefore, the Ishii units.
75
  Barenblatt puts the blame on the entire command structure of the 
Japanese army, but what is known, as historians like Harris have pointed out, was that Ishii was 
the main man in charge of a vast network of biological and chemical weapons research.  He was 
the commander of Unit 731 and overall coordinator of the activities of nearly all the biological 
weapons research facilities.  However, as Harris so deftly points out, there were many besides 
Unit 731, such as Unit 100 and Unit Ei 1644, along with the original facility at Beiyinhe and 
other small facilities elsewhere.  There was also a facility in Nanking and some research was 
carried out at Tokyo University and Kyoto University.  Some units were more autonomous of 
Ishii than others, while some of the naval hospitals, where experiments were conducted or 
practice surgeries perpetrated, were part of the network in the broader context of using people as 
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scientific commodities.  The exact number of units, which operated under Ishii, is still unclear.  
Many were small and obscure subunits, like Unit 200.  Historians like Harris and Barenblatt 
agree there were probably more biological warfare research units, but they may have been small 
and gone unnoticed or records of their existence was lost or destroyed at the end of the war. 
What many of these works lack or do not carry out to the fullest extent possible is placing 
the actions of these scientists within the context of the racist attitudes of the time.  The Japanese 
were influenced just as heavily by the pseudo-science of eugenics as Western nations and 
combined it with their own creation myths, which stated that Japan was created by the goddess, 
Amaterasu.
76
  The scientific theory of evolution did not seem to present a conflict with the 
mythos of Japan’s founding though most scientists in Japan recognized that the Japanese were 
originally a mixture of peoples collected together on the Japanese islands.
77
  To many of these 
scientists, a person’s superiority was not determined by the color of one’s skin but the purity of 
the soul.  The historian John W. Dower discusses the racist attitudes of Japan and the United 
States during the World War II in his book, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific 
War.  While he does not deal specifically with Unit 731 or Japan’s human experiments, his work 
is vital for placing this topic within the historiographical context of racism in the early 20
th
 
century, which was pushed by the ultra-nationalist movement in Japan.  Dower describes Japan’s 
version of racism as being more subtle than its Western counterpart but no less insidious or 
influential. 
 It is important to remember that the biological warfare research units were not only in the 
business of biological weapons development and testing, they also conducted other tests.  The 
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Ishii units regularly conducted experiments with poison gas agents, delivery systems for the 
biological agents they worked with, and other experiments, which do not really fall into a single 
category, such as experiments with electricity and studying decapitation.  Frostbite research was 
an important area of research at Ping Fan with the military application of trying to prevent and 
cure frostbite.  It was quite common to freeze the body parts of living people and then try to thaw 
them out.  For this purpose, an entire building was erected at Ping Fan to do frostbite research.  
Nor were biological and chemical weapons to be used specifically against people, they were also 
planned to be used on animals and crops, this being the focus of Unit 100.  Actual testimony 
from people who conducted these experiments or participated in other ways is lacking from 
Harris’ work.  Hal Gold dealt with this aspect by compiling many interviews from the Unit 731 
Exhibition that traveled Japan in the 1990s.  This makes Gold’s work invaluable from a historical 
perspective and fills a large hole in Harris’ work.  Taken as a collective, each historian’s 
contributions provide an excellent understanding of the scale of the activities of Unit 731 and 
units like it.  They demonstrate how the academic sphere in Japan worked with the military in the 
attempt to accomplish the goals of the state.  The actions of the scientists were motivated by the 
needs of the nation and justified by the racist atmosphere of the period. 
  
34 
 
III. THE MACHINE: ULTRA-NATIONALISM AND RACISM 
 
Ultra-Nationalism 
When examining Japan’s crimes in China and elsewhere across Asia, the individual 
crimes are nearly beyond count.  Figures of the victims and victimizers are often educated 
guesses at best and exact numbers will never truly be known.  The motivation of every Japanese 
war criminal will never be determined.  However, it is necessary to point out the ideology, which 
many of the perpetrators adhered to.  Many Japanese soldiers, officers, and scientists, like Ishii 
Shiro, were ardent ultra-nationalists who firmly believed Japan should be the leading country and 
the Japanese people’s rightful position was at the top of a racial hierarchy.  This ideology is 
similar to the racist dogma of the Nazis.  For the Nazis, the goal was the building of the Third 
Reich, whereby the German people would rule over Europe.  For the Imperial Japanese 
government, the goal was the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, whereby 
the Japanese would rule over Asia.  Any means necessary to meet these goals were deemed 
appropriate.  The war ended in defeat for Japan and Germany, but in the aftermath, there was 
punishment to deliver.  The Allied nations held war-crimes trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo, and 
at the trials in Tokyo, many of the nation’s top leaders during the war years, like former Prime 
Minister Hideki Tojo, were convicted and punished, paying for their crimes with their lives.  
When it came to Japan’s human experiment criminals, immunity and secrecy were the order of 
the day.  Of those in the Tokyo high command convicted of war crimes, none of these crimes 
was related to biological and chemical warfare.  As per the surrender agreement after the war, 
Emperor Hirohito was not held responsible for the actions of his nation during the war.  He was 
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allowed to continue as emperor on the condition he be relegated to being a symbolic monarch 
with no political power.   
After convincing the high command that biological weapons were worth researching, 
Ishii received permission and funding from the Kwantung Army to start the Beiyinhe facility 
near Harbin.  He had a small facility in Harbin, which he deemed too busy a city for anything but 
defensive research on vaccines and so he built an offensive research facility at Beiyinhe in 
1931.
78
  Ishii did this because he was very concerned about security, as the activities of the Ishii 
units were considered top-secret and having an offensive research in a city of any kind, but 
especially a city like Harbin with its high population of westerners, posed too much risk of 
discovery.  It was at Beiyinhe that Ishii conducted some of his first human experiments.  
Beiyinhe proved to be too small for what Ishii had planned and so the facility at Ping Fan was 
built in 1936 and operated until the end of the war.  It is unknown how many people died at these 
two facilities but the numbers are likely in the tens of thousands or more.  Around the same time, 
many other units were built across Manchukuo, China and other locations in the Japanese empire. 
 Throughout his years as an officer often made use of his connections with fellow ultra-
nationalists in the Tokyo High Command to secure funding.
79
  He also traveled to Kyoto 
Imperial University every year to give a lecture on “How Physicians Could Help the Military.”80  
Under the same principles of “proper place,” soldiers fought with guns and doctors fought with 
science.  Ishii pushed for more research in the field of biological warfare and for funding of his 
biological warfare research projects for which his ultra-nationalist connections became very 
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important.
81
  He firmly believed that biological weapons could make Japan strong.  His powerful 
sense of nationalism drove him and many other scientists to develop weapons of science, which 
could tilt the balance of power in the world in Japan’s favor.  Ishii was a believer in a very 
aggressive and expansionist variety of nationalism known as kokka banno shugi, which literally 
translates to “nation-almighty-ism.”82  In this case, shugi means “ism,” but if one takes the literal 
meaning of its kanji, or Chinese characters, a step further, which are 主義, it contains the 
characters for “chief” or “master” in the first character (主) and “honor,” “loyalty,” or 
“righteousness” in the second character (義).  The basic meaning of the phrase’s ideographs can 
imply unity as a nation with superiority and righteousness.  The devotees of Japan’s ultra-
nationalist movement used the slogan “the one hundred million” to describe the unity of the 
Japanese people.  This phrase was often used in slogans like “One hundred million advancing 
like a ball of flame.”83  It implied that the Japanese were many in body but one in spirit and that 
the “one hundred million” had one goal under one emperor.84  Ultra-nationalism was not a 
monolithic structure in Japan.  There were many different factions vying for power and influence 
but they held similar viewpoints.  The emperor was a living-god, and they used the principles of 
bushido to express their ideals of sacrifice and loyalty.  Bushido was the code of conduct, 
sometimes compared loosely to chivalry in Europe, used to govern the actions of the ruling 
samurai class in Tokugawa Japan.  The nationalists in Japan twisted bushido to rally the 
population to war.  The government used bushido’s code of self-sacrifice to justify their use of 
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the infamous “kamikaze” units whose purpose was to fly their warplanes into American ships.  It 
was the pinnacle of duty and honor to die for the Emperor.
85
  The emperor’s symbol, the cherry 
blossom, was used as a powerful representation of sacrifice because its color was pink which 
represented the mixing of red blood and white purity.  The cherry blossom was often an 
important visual icon in patriotic songs and poems.  It was also used to name the MXY-8 Ohka 
(cherry blossom), which was a rocket propelled, human guided flying bomb used to attack 
American ships on suicide missions in the final months of the war.
86
 
The Racism of the Military Machine 
The racist beliefs of the scientists provided justification to their actions.  They felt it was 
their right as the master race to conduct whatever experiments they felt was necessary in pursuit 
of Japan’s national goal of creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  The scientists 
under Ishii believed their biological weapons could be the key to Japan’s victory and that it was 
Japan’s rightful place to be masters over science as well as people.  Ishii has received so much 
attention because he was one the most charismatic and interesting of the people who conducted 
experiments, but he was not the only one.  The people who were test subjects were most often 
Chinese or Manchurian.  Japanese ultra-nationalism stated every group or race of people had a 
“proper place” in the world order, which was defined by a mix of nature and divinity.87  The 
Japanese referred to themselves as the Yamato race, and the ultra-nationalists taught that the 
proper place for their people was at the top with all others below.
88
  Captain Kojima Takeo, of 
the Imperial Army, expressed the “proper place” line of thinking well when he said, “We were 
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taught that Japan is a sacred country, that the people of Japan are a superior race, that the people 
of China, Korea, Southeast Asia, and Russia were all inferior races, and the superior race must 
govern them.  And by doing so, we would bring them happiness.”89  It was not one’s place to 
question one’s superiors in a society built on these principles and the same would have been true 
then of every race beneath the Japanese.  Captain Kojima goes on to describe how captured 
Chinese were used as bayonet practice and states this was standard in the Japanese army, so he 
too ordered his soldiers to practice in this way.
90
 
Nanyan Guo is one of the historians presented in Japan’s Wartime Medical Atrocities: 
Comparative inquiries in science, history, and ethics, “Discovering traces of humanity: Taking 
individual responsibility for medical atrocities.”  Nanyan Guo provides what is probably one of 
the best reflections on individual responsibility for this subject.  Nanyan Guo attempts to answer 
the question of what could motivate an otherwise normal person to commit acts of extreme 
barbarity.  Guo presents the reader with five people who participated in experiments.  These five 
attempted to justify their crimes and expressed feelings of pride in their work at Unit 731.  One 
such person, named Hiyama, stated “There is nothing shameful in what I did at Unit 731…The 
Soviet Union was also conducting research into germ weapons…I was doing this for Japan, and I 
am not ashamed at all of what I did.”91  Another states, “We believed that the war was conducted 
in order to bring wealth to Japan, which was a poor country in those days, and to bring peace to 
Asia… therefore we believed that maruta were not human beings. They were even lower than 
animals… No one in Unit 731 ever had any sympathy for them. To all of us, they deserved to 
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die.”92  Other interviewees also commonly used the word maruta, which means log.  The word 
itself is indicative of the dehumanization of the victims and came into use because the local 
Chinese were told Ping Fan was a logging camp.  Terms like maruta served to cement the idea 
that non-Japanese were little more than a resource, which the master Yamato race could exploit. 
 Despite the pervading racism in the camp, there were some rare instances of resistance by 
scientists and Japanese workers at Unit 731.  These misgivings did not often manifest themselves 
in open rebellion for what they were seeing or doing, but there are some cases of refusals to 
commit atrocities.  One member of Unit 516, known only as “technician lieutenant S.Y.,” was 
ordered to participate in a poison gas experiment on prisoners yet he refused by stating, “he was 
a Catholic, and therefore could not participate in such inhuman experiments.”93  Guo states that 
his resistance went unpunished which was quite rare in the Imperial Army where the slightest 
provocation called for severe punishment.  In another example of resistance, a junior member of 
Unit 731, named Tsuruta Kanetoshi, was ordered to pour typhoid into a river to poison the locals.  
When Ishii later asked how Tsuruta felt about the war, Tsuruta stated, “It’s better not to go to 
war.”  For that simple act of defiance, he fed lice with his own body for three days.94  An 
anonymous hygiene specialist gave an account of how two officers, Warrant Officer Murakami 
and his partner, Sergeant Maruyama, committed suicide.
95
  The two had been infecting the local 
water supply.  The anonymous witness speculated that Murakami might have felt bad about 
infecting people because locals had been approaching them with accusations of poisoning the 
water and that was the reason for his suicide.  He also believed that Maruyama might have 
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committed suicide because he was under pressure from other officers after Murakami killed 
himself.  The anonymous witness does not give a clear reason why Maruyama was pressured to 
commit suicide.
96
  Examples of resistance are rare and there is no way to calculate how prevalent 
it was in the absence of an official record recording such events.   
Nakagawa Yonezo, who studied at Osaka University during the war, was shown videos 
of experiments, about which he later commented, “some of the experiments had nothing to do 
with advancing the capability of germ warfare, or of medicine.  There is such a thing as 
professional curiosity: ‘What would happen if we did such and such?’ What medical purpose 
was served by performing and studying beheadings? None at all.  That was just playing around.  
Professional people, too, like to play.”97  In the racist hierarchy of the East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, those deemed lesser races existed to be used, whether it was in the name of science or 
curiosity, it mattered little as long as the goals of the Yamato race were advanced.  To achieve 
his goal of seeing Japan take its rightful place in the world order, Ishii created sub-units to work 
independently and in concert with Unit 731. 
Beyond Unit 731: Unit 100 
 As part of the cause to advance Japan’s claim of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
other units were created to conduct biological warfare research.  They were part of a coordinated 
network, many operating under the command of Unit 731 while some operated independently.  
Unit 100 was a subsidiary unit of Unit 731.  It was also known as the Wakamatsu Unit because 
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its director was Major General Wakamatsu Yujiro.
98
  The unit was located in Changchun, which 
was the capital city of the Manchukuo puppet-state, and Unit 100’s specialty was veterinary 
diseases as well as diseases, which could affect crops.
99
  Upon first glance, this specialty might 
seem relatively benign compared to the notorious Unit 731, but Unit 100 did not just conduct 
tests on animals and crops, they were very active in testing these same diseases on humans to see 
what the effects might be.  Unit 100 did extensive testing of anthrax and glanders on humans.  
Barenblatt was able to uncover two documents, which detail thirty individuals experimented on 
with anthrax and twenty-one with glanders.  Barenblatt notes that none of the individual’s names 
were given and in the diagrams, all of them were drawn with the same face and body; their 
identities were unimportant to their killers.
100
  It is also likely that many of the victims of Unit 
100 were Soviet POWs.  The anonymous hygiene specialist mentioned in the previous section 
also attested to Russians being used in experiments at the Unit 731 Ping Fan facility when he 
claimed to have seen a white Russian who had been cut in half lengthwise and placed in a human 
sized specimen jar.  He was caught looking at the Russian by an officer and he ran away, an 
officer later approached his detachment to demand who had seen the Russian and when he came 
forward, he was hit in the head with a kendo practice sword.
101
  The information revealing Unit 
100 used Soviet POWs was gleaned from interrogations conducted during the United States 
investigation into Japan’s biological weapons program after the war in 1946 when members of 
the unit were questioned.
102
  Wakamatsu was evasive and lied during his mild interrogation, but 
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one of his subordinates was questioned more thoroughly.  The subordinate, Kino Takeshi, 
explicitly implicated Wakamatsu and many others in Unit 100 for conducting human 
experiments, including vivisections.  Kino also gave testimony of the human experiments carried 
out by Unit 100, though he was always careful not to implicate himself in direct involvement.
103
  
He stated that glanders was one of the diseases being researched and that vivisections were 
conducted in outdoor dissecting areas.  In his testimony, he also stated that he believed Soviet 
POWs were being experimented on along with many Chinese.
104
 
Unit Ei 1644 
 Unit Ei 1644, more widely known at the time as the Tama Unit, was located in Nanking, 
site of the infamous Rape of Nanking.
105
  Established on 18 April 1939 in the heart of Nanking 
less than fourteen months after the chaos of the Rape, Ishii placed the unit under the leadership 
of Masuda Tomosada.  The reason for choosing Nanking as the unit’s location is still a mystery. 
106
  It is also unclear if locating the unit to Nanking had any connection with the rapes and 
massacres in the months before.  While not the largest unit in Ishii’s biological weapons empire, 
Unit 1644 experimented on and killed thousands of Chinese.  One of the unit’s main functions 
was the mass production of bacteria for use in attacks and possibly by other units for research.
107
  
Small compared to other units, 1644 had about 1500 personnel working at a central office and 
headquarters with a hospital and four story attachment that housed the research labs and a prison 
where test subjects were kept.
108
  Like many of Ishii’s units, Unit 1644 was well funded and 
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despite its official designation as a battalion, the unit received funds in the amount that was 
normally be allotted to a regiment, as attested to by an interview conducted after the war with an 
anonymous member of the unit, one of the only available from Unit 1644.
109
  This anonymous 
source makes note of an interesting detail, which was that everyone associated with human 
experiments wore a special button on the side of their hat.
110
  He denies his own involvement 
saying that his job involved caring for animals and taking their blood for testing and producing 
vaccines.  As a kind of hazing ritual, he describes how new members to the unit were required to 
clean the specimen rooms.  The anonymous source recounts how soldiers put fireflies in the 
room and that the glow from them around the body parts was very eerie and “some of the young 
recruits suffered emotional problems from the experience.”111  Unit 1644 did not only conduct 
experiments using biological agents, they also received supplies of “nitrile prussiate, acetone, 
cyanide hydric, arsenic, poison taken from Taiwanese snakes such cobra, habu, and amagasa, as 
well as crystallized blowfish poison and refined trikabuto poison.”112  The Ninth Army 
Technology Research Institute shipped the products to Unit 1644 for use in experiments in 
addition to Unit 1644 collaboration on experiments and field tests with Unit 731.
113
 
Unit 516 
 Unit 516 was different from Ishii’s other biological weapons units whose priority was 
biological warfare.  Unit 516’s primary function was as a chemical warfare research unit, which 
worked semi-autonomously from Unit 731.  The unit was located in Qiqihar and conducted 
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experiments throughout the war including coordinated experiments with Unit 731 who also 
conducted some experiments using chemical weapons as well as other substances such as carbon 
monoxide.
114
  Unit 516 was one of many chemical weapons units in China many of their 
weapons were simply abandoned, buried, or dumped into rivers.  The Japanese government 
denied for about fifty years that there were such weapons in China and Manchuria but finally in 
the 1990s acknowledged the presence of Japanese chemical weapons in China.  In Manchuria 
alone, it is estimated there are about 700,000 weapons remaining, while the Chinese government 
contends at least two million weapons are still present.
115
  The victims of Unit 516 continue to 
add up because dangerous chemicals left behind continue to kill.  On 4 August 2003, 
construction workers at a site in the city of Qiqihar uncovered five drums filled with mustard 
gas.
116
  At least thirty-six people were injured when the drums were ruptured and one person, Li 
Guizhen, died from his injuries at a hospital after he became covered in liquid mustard gas and 
sustained burns on about 95% of his body, eyes, and lungs.
117
  With so many chemical weapons 
still present in China and Manchuria, the finding of these toxins is common and Li will likely not 
be the last victim. 
Other Known Units 
 There were many other Japanese units conducting both biological weapons testing and 
chemical weapons testing.  One such unit was Unit 1855, of which little is known aside from its 
location in Peking (Beijing) and that it was involved in biological weapons attacks against 
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Chinese civilians and military forces in conjunction with Unit 731 and Unit Ei 1644.  One of the 
most notorious operations conducted in one of these joint operations carried out by Unit 731 and 
Unit 1644, was the biological warfare attacks on Baoshan in which an estimated 200,000 people 
died during largest and most destructive biological warfare epidemic.
118
  The attack was carried 
out through several different methods, which included contaminating water sources, 
contaminated food left for children, and special ceramic bombs that broke open on impact with 
not explosives and released a gelatinous substance containing flies to spread disease.  Cholera is 
most commonly spread through water, however Barenblatt specifically states that the ceramic 
bombs contained cholera-carrying flies.
119
  This attack was just one of many on the area and 
other units were involved, including Unit 113 of which very little is known.  A member of this 
unit named Minori Shinano would admit after the war to releasing contagions into the water in 
Yunnan Province, which was considered strategically important by the Japanese because it is on 
the border region of China and Burma.
120
  In total, at least four biological weapons units were 
involved in the cholera attacks on Yunnan Province, including Unit 731, Unit Ei 1644, Unit 113, 
and Unit 8604.  Unfortunately, little is known about Unit 8604 other than it being referred to as 
the Nami Unit, which could be a code name or it was possibly named after its commander, as 
this was a common practice throughout the Japanese army.  Japan’s plans for Baoshan were not 
over with the first attack in May 1942.  More cholera bombs would be dropped throughout 
Yunnan Province in April 1942 after Baoshan was leveled in a series of bombing attacks with a 
combination of high explosive, incendiary, and cholera bombs.
121
  During Barenblatt’s study of 
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three bombing attacks on the city of Baoshan on 5, 6, and 8 May, he noted that the Japanese 
effectively destroyed the city after the first bombing runs on May 5, leaving one to question why 
the Japanese continued to bomb the city for two more days.  He states the reason for the 
subsequent bombings was that people infecting other people and water sources most effectively 
spread diseases like cholera.  To get the people to spread to the outlying areas, Japan bombed the 
city for two days after the initial bombings to chase out those hiding in the rubble and thereby 
spreading cholera across the province.  They were so effective that the Chinese Nationalist Army 
was unable to keep troops in Yunnan Province and when farmers from outlying areas went into 
the city to loot, they inadvertently carried out cholera-contaminated items and further spread the 
epidemic.
122
  Because Japan had forced the Chinese Nationalist Army to withdraw, it was able to 
free up troops for other theaters of war.  No mention is made of how Japan prevented its own 
troops from catching cholera but the Japanese did have a number of water filtration systems 
including at least one invented by Ishii before the war.
123
  These filtration systems filtered out 
any cholera that might be present in water sources.  Japan had carried out one of the most 
effective biological attacks in history.  There has been some debate about how effective Unit 731 
was in its research and how far Japan had really advanced in biological warfare research.  Ishii 
was, after all, prone to over the top showmanship and exaggeration.  However, what is seen in 
Yunnan Province is the work of a dedicated, well-orchestrated, attack carried out using bombs 
developed by Unit 731 and coordinated with a number of units in the Unit 731 network, and 
managed to affect one of the deadliest biological warfare campaigns in history over the space of 
a few short months.  
                                                 
122
 Barenblatt, 164-165. 
123
 Ibid. 
47 
 
The Broader Context 
 In the last desperate days of the war, Japan was willing to sacrifice thousands of men on 
remote islands like Iwo Jima, bonsai charges on Okinawa, and suicide kamikaze attacks against 
American naval ships.  Often in these fierce battles, neither side attempted to take prisoners.  
Neither the Japanese nor the United States had a monopoly on hatred and racism.  A sense of 
justice and purpose on both sides often fueled the ferocity of the battles in the Pacific.  The 
Japanese were fighting to gain their “proper place” against what they often described as a 
demonic horde of bloodthirsty foreigners, and the United States believed it was fighting against a 
beastly race of savages who murdered everywhere they went.
124
  Fuelled by racial hate from 
every side, World War II’s brutality was not without limits.  It did not become the chemical 
apocalypse some feared.  Regardless of the numbers of chemical weapons in China, Japan was 
underequipped to use gas in the Pacific theater, while the Japanese believed the United States 
was far better prepared.
125
  The Tokyo High Command believed, including Tojo Hideki, that the 
United States would only use gas in a retaliatory manner or maybe to break a stalemate on the 
battlefield.  In either case, neither side significantly deployed gas against the other.
126
 
While it is convenient to point to the Japanese army units as the main perpetrators of 
human experiments, the range of criminals goes well beyond these units.  Also involved were 
universities, military hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies.  Just like there were many units, 
there were many other participants.  The scientists of Unit 731 published details of human 
experiments and their findings in medical and scientific journals in Japan under the weak guise 
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of experiments on animals.  Japan’s secret biological warfare research was really an open secret 
within the scientific community of Japan.  Great pains were taken at Ping Fan to maintain local 
secrecy, resulting in the murder of the Chinese who helped build the facility.  In Japan, Unit 731 
kept its activities secret from the public, but the scientific community was aware of what the unit 
was doing.  By the end of 1945 and before they were aware of the extent to which Japan was 
conducting research into offensive capabilities, the United States was also aware of the 
connection between the biological warfare units and Japan’s major universities.127  The report 
also identified the various water purification units as being involved in biological weapons, 
which is now known to be true.
128
  One of the covers for Ishii’s units was that they were 
epidemic disease prevention and water purification units.  This made sense considering Ishii 
actually invented a water purification system in use by the Japanese army.
129
 
 In 1948, several medical professors and students were accused of carrying out human 
experiments on eight US airmen, including vivisections.
130
  The trial was held at Yokohama, a 
city near Tokyo, and was part of the Class B and C war crimes trials.  The professors and 
students were also accused of cooking and eating the organs of the US aviators in what appeared 
to be some form of ritual ceremony.
131
  Two professors were sentenced to death, however, one 
committed suicide and the other’s sentence was commuted to life in prison, while the students 
received lengthy prison terms.
132
  The trial shows that experiments took place on the Japanese 
mainland at least in a limited fashion.  The university obtained the prisoners from the military 
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who had custody of the aviators after they were captured when their B-29 bomber was shot 
down.
133
  Both Kyoto and Tokyo University stand accused of aiding in Ishii’s experiments and 
there is testimony to back up the accusations.  A professor emeritus at Osaka University who 
studied at Kyoto University during the war named Nakagawa Yonezo testified that he and other 
students watched videos of human testing and executions.
134
  His instructor told them that some 
tests were better performed on humans.
135
  He then viewed a video of air injected into the arm of 
a prisoner in a testing unit in Manchukuo in order to cause a fatal air embolism along with videos 
of beheadings.
136
  The instructor, Nakagawa recalls, told them that medicine must become a 
weapon.  This justification does not explain why such experiments were conducted except out of 
simple curiosity.
137
  The instructor was repeating the way Ishii felt about medicine.  He was 
instilling in his students the ultra-nationalist view of medicine as a tool for the betterment of the 
state. 
In June 1989, construction workers discovered numerous human remains at the former 
Army Medical College in Shinjuku, Tokyo.  They uncovered over a hundred individuals, mostly 
skulls of men.
138
  Forensic examiners who conducted the investigation claimed the skulls showed 
signs of being preserved and many appeared to have been used for ear and brain surgery 
training.
139
  It was not stated if this was done while they were alive or as cadavers.  They were 
described as “Mongoloid” in origin and some were believed to be Chinese, Korean, and 
                                                 
133
 Barenblatt, 218-219. 
134
 Nakagawa, 221-222. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 Gold, 126-127. 
139
 Ibid, 126-127. 
50 
 
Japanese.
140
  The origins are consistent with the demographics of those experimented on by Unit 
731 and other units and hospitals.  Though no direct link with Unit 731 was confirmed, it has 
been shown that they were not the only ones conducting human experiments and that human 
exploitation was conducted throughout the Japanese empire.  The Shinjuku ward administration 
attempted to cremate the bones, however citizen activists stopped the cremation and the bones 
are still under the possession of a local funeral home and their fate is still undecided.
141
  China 
was also critical of the attempted cremation of the bones because they believed it was an 
attempted cover-up, but formal complaints were not filed.
142
 
 Human exploitation by the Japanese military was not explicitly married to human 
experimentation.  It took on many forms including the now widely publicized abuse of the 
comfort women who were women forced into prostitution by the Japanese military to service 
Japanese soldiers.  These women were mostly Koreans, but some were Chinese, and very few 
Japanese.  Rapes committed by the Japanese army were common.  The Rape of Nanking is 
probably the most famous example in which thousands of women were raped in an orgy of 
violence and murder after Japan captured the city of Nanking.  When it came to rape, Unit 731 
was no different from many other Japanese army units.  Hal Gold recorded a lecture by Nishino 
Rumiko, a lead researcher on the comfort women.
143
  In her lecture, she describes speaking to a 
member of Unit 731 during which he explained he had a human experiment scheduled but with 
time to kill he and another unit member went to the prison and located two Chinese women.  The 
other man raped the first woman, who suffered from the effects of a frostbite experiment because 
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she had missing fingers, her exposed bones were black, and she had gangrene.  The second 
woman escaped rape because they observed she showed symptoms of a venereal disease.
144
  
Another account given by Nishino is of a man named Yoshimura Hisato who became the head of 
the Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine after World War II.  During his time with Unit 731, 
Yoshimura studied frostbite and in one experiment he injected a temperature-sensing needle into 
the hand of a three-month-old baby whom he then placed in ice water in order to measure the 
temperature changes.  After the war was over, Mrs. Nishino stated Yoshimura published the 
experiment along with the results in a Japanese medical journal.
145
   
Another example of the way the Japanese exploited those they viewed as inferior was the 
use of Chinese soldiers and civilians for bayonet practice.  They would often force the prisoner 
to kneel or tie them to a wooden post.  Japanese soldiers were then required to approach the 
prisoner and conduct bayonet drills upon them, repeatedly stabbing the person.  Tomioka 
Heihachiro, a member of a hygiene corps, remembered from his wartime experience that he was 
told one day they would do bayonet practice on five prisoners captured by the Kenpeitai, Japan’s 
version of the Gestapo.  When they brought them in he saw that, the prisoners were just 
seventeen or eighteen years old.  Nevertheless, he and twenty-four others lined up and repeatedly 
stabbed them repeatedly.  He recalled hearing one of the boys crying for his mother before he 
died.
146
  At the time of the killing, Tomioka was in the Youth Corp, a militant organization of 
teenage boys similar to the Hitler Youth in Nazi Germany.
147
  Another example of prisoners used 
for training was the trial, USA vs. Kajuro Aihara et al.  In this case, thirty-three men were 
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accused of the murder of United States aviators.  Eight aviators were used to train young officers 
of a guerilla unit on the island of Kyushu, one of the four large islands that make up the Japanese 
home island chain.  The officers practiced karate techniques on the prisoners, fired arrows from 
bows and crossbows at several other aviators, and beheaded the rest with swords as part of the 
training exercise.
148
  The incident occurred in August 1945, less than a month before the end of 
the war in September. 
Most of the biological warfare research detachments, like Unit 731, were part of the 
Japanese Imperial Army.  However, the Japanese Imperial Navy also conducted human 
experiments at military hospitals in the Pacific.  This attested to by two court cases, which also 
represents the few instances of Japanese prosecuted for human experiments.  In the first, USA vs. 
Iwanami Hiroshi et al., nineteen Japanese were charged with the murder of eight captured US 
airmen at a hospital on Dublon Island.
149
  The trial was held in 1947 and the court documents 
record that the nineteen accused were charged with murder.  The document stated they had 
“without justifiable cause…injure, infect and kill, by experimenting with infections of virulent 
bacteria, with exposures to shock and with other methods…,” murdered the captured aviators.150  
Unit 731 conducted experiments similar to the charges leveled at the nineteen defendants but no 
connection was ever made in the recorded court proceedings between the hospital on Dublon and 
Unit 731.  Four of the Americans were injected with streptococcus bacteria and developed blood 
poisoning which killed them soon after.
151
  A man named Nakamura, who was witness to the 
crime, stated two doctors who were dead by the time of the trial along with the commanding 
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officer of the hospital, Iwanami Hiroshi, conducted a shock experiment on the remaining four 
American prisoners where by tourniquets were tied on the arms and legs of each prisoner.  Two 
Americans had the tourniquets left on for two hours and the other two Americans had the 
tourniquets on for seven hours.  After the allotted time had passed, the tourniquets were quickly 
removed.
152
  Two of the Americans died instantly due to shock and the other two survived but 
were strangled soon after.   
A separate trial was held for Surgeon Lieutenant Commander Ueno Chisato, head 
medical officer of the Forty-first Naval Guard Unit, and Captain Asano Shimpei, who were 
accused of mistreating United States prisoners in USA vs. Asano Shimpei, et. al.
153
  Ueno 
requested and received permission to perform an operation on two captured US aviators.  Ueno 
and several other of the accused removed the right toenail, made an incision in the right breast 
and abdomen, incised the right testicle, and exposed the femoral artery in the right thigh of one 
prisoner.
154
  Ueno claimed the operation was to correct a nail bed infection and the other 
incisions were to check for internal bleeding.
155
  His excuse that he was just treating a nail bed 
infection, even to someone with no medical background, was absurd.  During the operation, 
Ueno exited the room and told a man named Nagashima to “take care of” the second prisoner 
who was then taken to an area near the sick bay and bayoneted to death by another man named, 
Tanaka, and four or five other unnamed soldiers.
156
    Ueno, Iwanami, and Asano were sentenced 
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to death by hanging.  In both incidents, POWs were requested for a specific purpose and both 
requests were granted.  Iwanami was also accused of taking organ samples from the POWs he 
murdered and placing them in bottles and then boiling down the skulls to be sent to Tokyo where 
they have still not been recovered.
157
  This last accusation is supported by the discovery of the 
skulls in Shinjuku, which investigators had determined were sent there from elsewhere in the 
Japanese empire and while there is no discernible link between the two incidents, it helps to 
illustrate that such actions were undertaken in at least a limited capacity. 
Under the racist concept of “proper-place,” non-Japanese were merely tools of the 
Yamato race.  However, in order to obtain a clearer picture of Japan’s war crimes, it is necessary 
to view the actions of the scientists of Unit 731 in the context of the racist ideology held by many 
in Japanese society, particularly in the military.  Nationalism provided the motivation for some 
scientists and the atmosphere of racism delivered the justification to conduct human experiments.  
Many officers, soldiers, and scientists were extremely patriotic and firmly believed it was the 
rightful place of the Japanese people to stand at the top of the pantheon of nations.  They 
believed science and myth dictated the divine right of the Yamato race to stand above all other 
nations.  Ultra-nationalist thought dictated that the Japanese were a racially pure people, both in 
heritage and in morality.  It was therefore necessary to try to raise other people to be nearer the 
level of the Japanese through the spreading of Japanese culture with the purpose of creating a 
coalition of racial groups under Japanese rule.
158
  However, those raised up by the Japanese 
would never be the equals of the Japanese and would always remain tools of the master Yamato 
race.  
                                                 
157
 Wang, 38. 
158
 Dower 288-289. 
55 
 
IV. THE UNITED STATES AND COVER-UP 
 
 The United States government actively sought to cover-up Japan’s human experiments 
after the war.  General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, issued orders 
to offer Japanese scientists protection from war-crimes prosecution in exchange for scientific 
data on biological weapons, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington D.C sanctioned these 
orders.  When the investigation started, the Japanese scientists were fearful of prosecution and 
lied or downplayed the type of research conducted.  Once they received immunity from General 
MacArthur, the Japanese scientist became much more compliant with their captors and turned 
over a wealth of information.  Ishii Shiro managed to stay in hiding until 1946, but other 
members of Unit 731 were caught quickly.  Only after securing immunity did Ishii come forward.  
Most of the Japanese scientists in Manchukuo managed to escape capture by the Russians and 
fled to Japan.   
The United States knew about Japan’s chemical warfare research before World War II 
started and the information the US possessed on that subject was extensive.  In 1943, a manual, 
which details the capabilities of chemical warfare for Germany, Italy, and Japan, was prepared 
by the Military Intelligence Service section of the War Department.  The document describes 
various weapons and apparatuses for use in chemical warfare operations.  It also includes 
information on how the weapons were used and how effective they were.  Most of this 
knowledge was gained through captured examples from contact in the field by American and 
British forces.  The document also acknowledges that chemical weapons were used in China on 
civilian and military targets.  One section of the document states that chemical weapons 
produced in Himeji, Japan, were shipped to Manchukuo for use in testing by the Kwantung 
56 
 
Army; however, it never states if this was human testing.
159
  Unit 731 and its subsidiaries used 
chemical agents in tests, though their primary purpose was the study of biological weapons.  
There were at least two regiments of about 1500 soldiers each whose sole purpose conducting 
chemical warfare operation. There were also many smaller units normally consisting of about 
fifty men each attached to regular army regiments and these men would specialize in the 
dispersal of chemical weapons.  Mustard gas and lewisite were the two main chemical agents 
produced by Japan, though they had at least thirteen other highly toxic chemicals for testing and 
use.
160
  In one test, described by an anonymous Imperial Army major, Unit 731 and Unit 516 
held a joint operation east of Harbin, possibly at the Anda testing grounds.  During the test, a 
prisoner was put in a glass tank and adamsite was pumped in.  This gas, also known as sneezing 
gas, caused the prisoner to have violent convulsions and extreme pain.  The anonymous observer 
stated there were at least ten scientists and technicians present, and that after about ten minutes, 
he could no longer watch.
161
  The War Department document confirmed adamsite was available 
to the Japanese and lists agents available to Italy, Germany, the United States, and France.
162
  
Some of the gases listed are mustard gas, lewisite, mustard lewisite mixture, chlorine, cyanogen 
bromide, arsine, phosgene, and adamsite.  In total, twenty-three gases, including their tactical 
class, are listed.  Nine agents classified as harassing were non-fatal irritants like tear gas.  
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Another fourteen agents listed as casualty, like mustard gas and chlorine gas, could kill or cause 
long-term injuries
163
 
The Japanese also developed gas grenades and devices called “candles” which released 
toxins after being activated and thrown.  Japan’s capabilities were ranked during the war by the 
United States as being similar to Italy because both countries were believed to have begun their 
development of chemical weapons after World War I.  For Japan, early testing was thought to be 
almost purely defensive, with offensive capabilities being developed after 1926.
164
  Japan’s 
development of chemical weapons was advanced and the Japanese were capable of effectively 
delivering toxic agents via multiple delivery systems in the air and on the ground.  During the 
war in China, gassing enemy positions before an assault became common practice.  In an 
interview, a Japanese soldier named Tanisuga Shizuo recounts how he was assigned to a poison 
gas unit in 1937 and trained in the use and cleanup of chemical weapons.  He describes how he 
used red canisters in combat.  They had a fuse and when lit and used under favorable wind 
conditions would release a cloud of noxious gas that would drift toward enemy positions.  The 
soldiers had to wear special rubberized outfits and headgear lest they be exposed themselves.  
Tanisuga states that he only used gas one time in combat and describes how the Chinese fled, as 
they often did not have gasmasks.  The gas used was sneezing gas, or adamsite, the same 
substance used in joint Unit 731 and 516 tests on prisoners.  Tanisuga describes how an old 
woman with bound feet was caught by the gas because she was unable to run and suffered 
horrible coughing fits before dying.  Tanisuga Shizuo became a member of the Poison Gas 
Workers’ Association after the war.  The Association works to secure compensation for the 
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injuries suffered by those who made and used poison gas during World War II.  He claimed to 
have documented the number of times gas was used over the course of the war and states that it 
was used, “nine times in 1937, 185 in 1938, 465 in 1939, 259 in 1940, and 48 in 1941.”165  
Japan’s had sufficiently developed its chemical weapons to be effective in combat, but the 
Japanese did not use poison gas against US soldiers out of fear of reprisal chemical attacks by 
the United States. 
The United States government appears to have had little knowledge of Japan’s early 
biological weapons research.  There were a few indications that Japan was conducting biological 
warfare research in the late 1930s but due to racist attitudes in the US these were ignored out of 
the belief Japan was incapable of such research.  The United States suspected during World War 
I that the Germans might have used, or tried to use, the glanders virus to incapacitate horses in 
cavalry units.  This raised the possibility that biological weapons might be used during World 
War II.
166
  Many in the war department believed that the Japanese were not inventors and lacked 
the imagination to develop biological weapons and were only capable of making poor copies of 
innovations from other countries.  As Harris states, “the Japanese stereotype in the West was that 
of an industrious people who were hardworking, disciplined, but lacking in imagination or 
creativity.”167  The United States feared more from the Germans with respect to biological and 
chemical weapons. 
By the time World War II started, Japan was capable of using chemical and biological 
weapons within their theaters of combat.  They proved this when they conducted one of the most 
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effective biological attacks in history in a part of China called Yunnan Province.  An unnamed 
informant reported that while stationed in Japan he overheard a drunken German scientist boast 
that the German doctors were in Japan solely to “teach Japanese the art of bacterial warfare and 
that someday Germany would get its revenge over the United States through the use of that mode 
of warfare.”168  Any development at this stage was not in the same form as conducted by Ishii 
and not on the same industrial scale.  After it became apparent by 1937, because of coverage by 
multiple media sources, that Japan was actively conducting biological warfare attacks in China 
the United States government continued to believe that Japan was not capable of delivering 
biological weapons to the mainland US even if they possessed the weapons.
169
  The assessment 
at the time that Japan was not able to deliver such weapons to the United States mainland was 
likely accurate if one considers the delivery capabilities of their conventional weapons.  However, 
the Japanese were capable of delivering biological weapons to a local theater of combat. 
In 1939, an incident occurred which would require the United States government to take 
seriously the threat of biological attack from Japan in the event of war.  In February 1939, a 
group of Japanese scientists suddenly showed up at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical 
Research in New York.  Their visit was unannounced and they made a request for yellow fever 
virus, which is very deadly and spreads quickly via mosquitoes.
170
  Among the scientists was the 
infamous Naito Ryoichi of Unit 731.  After their initial request was turned down, Naito 
attempted to bribe a technician with $3000, which was once again turned down.
171
  The 
Rockefeller Institute reported the incident to the United States government along with another 
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incident, which occurred in August of the same year.  The Rockefeller Institute turned down a 
request for yellow fever virus by a well-known Japanese bacteriologist named Dr. Miyagawa 
Yonetsugi.
172
  The Rockefeller Institute incidents highlight a brazen attempt by Japan to acquire 
new diseases and more importantly, the beginning of awareness by the US government that the 
Japanese were actively pursuing biological agents for research at a time when tensions were high.  
Considering the work on biological weapons being done at the time by Naito, it seems likely the 
intention was to weaponize it or to make a vaccine and develop treatments in the event the 
United States used yellow fever attacks on Japan. 
Investigation 
 One of the first investigators of Japan’s biological warfare research and human 
experiments was Lieutenant-Colonel Murray Sanders of Fort Detrick in Maryland, which was 
the United States’ main biological warfare research facility.  During the war, one of Sanders’ 
tasks was the interception and study of Japan’s balloon program, which was feared could carry 
diseases to be spread across the United States mainland.  These balloons were launched from 
Japan and would float across the Pacific using airstreams and some would eventually land in the 
United States.  Often, they carried incendiary devices but very few casualties were reported 
because the balloons mostly landed out in the wilderness.  None of the balloons Sanders would 
examine came back positive for any biological or chemical agents.
173
  Yet Sanders did not fail to 
express to those above him the danger he believed the balloons posed.  Because of his warnings, 
the War Department in Washington D.C. granted Fort Detrick the funds required by Sanders for 
more research.  The balloons likely posed little danger because they would have been highly 
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ineffective at delivering any diseases and then disseminating them amongst the population.
174
  
There was one report in 1994 by a man named Yoshikuma Ogura who claimed to have 
knowledge that Japan was conducting germ attacks against the Soviet Union using balloons.  
However, he mentioned no details of how they worked and his is likely the only real record of 
such balloons existing.
175
   
Barenblatt believed Sanders knew the balloons would not be effective for biological 
weapons delivery but used them to stoke fear amongst government officials to secure funding for 
his own research projects.  It is similar to how Ishii gained his funding early in his career by 
constantly espousing the supposed benefits of biological warfare and not letting the lack of 
evidence stop him.  Others clearly did not express Sanders’ fears because a report dated 2 
January 1944 sent to Lieutenant-Colonel M. Moses discusses the discovery of two balloons on 
the Pacific coast, and the following investigation which determined that the balloons found 
would be highly ineffectual for delivering disease agents.
176
  Various possibilities for 
dissemination were discussed including the possibilities that balloons might carry live animals 
though this was deemed highly unfeasible considering the high-altitude conditions the balloons 
would be traveling through.
177
  The author of the report also concludes that to use something like 
rats would likely mean they planned to use plague.  Considering much of the Midwest United 
States already has plague, the conclusion was using such a disease would be pointless.  The only 
other method of dissemination would involve bugs.  These are again, unlikely to survive the 
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journey and the time of year the balloons were launched would not be ideal for insects.
178
  The 
report does not conclude that balloons are impossible for spreading biological agents, but 
strongly suggests that any such attempt would be highly ineffectual and inefficient.   
As with Japan’s research, the conducting of experiments with deadly diseases did not 
come without risk and one incident in particular nearly ruined the career of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sanders.  During one incident in 1943, ten researchers were exposed to brucellosis, which causes 
undulant fever.  One of those infected was Gifford Bryce Pinchot, son of Gifford Pinchot Sr., 
who was the former governor of Pennsylvania.  Sanders and the other doctors fought hard to 
save Pinchot using a combination of penicillin and streptomycin, managing to save the young 
man’s life while some of the others infected were not so fortunate and died.179  Sanders then had 
a dinner with the man’s father, along with two United States Supreme Court Justices, and during 
the course of the evening explained what happened to Pinchot’s son.  Camp Detrick’s activities 
were considered highly classified and Sanders was placed under house arrest by his commanding 
officer.  The very influential Gifford Pinchot Sr. was able to secure Sanders’ freedom and earn 
him the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
180
  In another case, a technician was infected by highly toxic 
Clostriduim Botulinum when it was accidently sprayed into his eye.
181
  Robert Stroud wrote the 
report on the incident and Stroud suggested the disease be used in invasions because it could be 
dispersed in fine inert powder-like silicon and causing illness within two to twenty-four hours.
182
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This report was forwarded to the Army, Navy, and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the 
precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency.
183
 
 Before 1937, there was little interest in the United States government or military about 
biological warfare.  After realizing the course other countries were taking in developing the 
weapons, especially Germany whose capabilities the United States thought were more advanced 
than Japan, the United States began a coordinated research effort in 1942.  The US very quickly 
caught up, ultimately surpassing just about every other country by the end of the war.
184
  This 
change in attitude is what led to the investigations into Japan’s biological warfare program and 
the subsequent cover-up.  It also came with the knowledge that Japan was actively using 
biological warfare on people in Manchukuo by poisoning wells and reservoirs in 1944.
185
  By 
1945, the United States military was well aware of Ishii Shiro.  Sanders admitted that General 
MacArthur was very worried about biological warfare attacks when the invasion of Japan took 
place, believing that Ishii would almost certainly use biological warfare to stop American 
soldiers.  Because of this, Sanders was posted to MacArthur’s staff in preparation for the 
invasion and the investigation into Japan’s biological warfare program in the aftermath of the 
war.
186
  Sanders would be one of the first to investigate and when he arrived in Japan at the end 
of the war, the invasion having never come to fruition, he was in for a surprise.  Waiting for him 
on the docks of Yokohama was a member of Unit 731 named Naito Ryoichi.  Naito was smiling 
and holding a picture of Sanders, a greeting Sanders likely did not expect.
187
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 Naito was not very forthcoming with information about Unit 731.  It stands to reason this 
was because Naito knew what could befall himself and his compatriots should Sanders become 
fully aware of what the unit was doing.  After making no progress in his interviews, Sanders 
decided to bluff and told Naito that a new investigator was being brought in and that the Soviets 
would be involved.  The bluff worked and Naito produced what became known as the Naito 
Document.  This document listed the chain of command for Unit 731 and placed the Emperor at 
the top though Naito stressed the Emperor was not involved in subsequent interrogations.
188
  It is 
possible it was mere formality to place the Emperor at the top of the list, but when coupled with 
other evidence, it seems likely Emperor Hirohito was aware of what Unit 731 was doing.  Naito 
also denied that prisoners were used for experiments.  At first, Sanders believed Naito, but after 
more questioning, he realized Naito was lying.
189
  Naito admitted the Army Medical College in 
Tokyo conducted research into biological weapons.  He stated the College’s research focused on 
small-scale defensive operations, such as studying ways to quickly mass produce bacteria if large 
amounts of immunization agents were needed.
190
  How extensive the studies in Tokyo were is 
still unknown.  However, in order to get this far in the investigation, Sanders had to give Naito a 
guarantee that he and his fellow scientists receive protection from war-crimes proceedings, a 
request MacArthur was willing to grant.
191
  Many of these orders were declassified under the 
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, including one issued 17 April 1947, which stated that “no 
action be taken on prosecution or any form of publicity of this case without the concurrence of 
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the Military Intelligence Corps (G-2).  This is by direct order of the C-n-C and CS.”192  The “C-
n-C”, or Commander and Chief, in the order were General Douglas MacArthur and the “CS” was 
MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Richard Sutherland.  Sanders and the other investigators would find 
no shortage of people to investigate as not long after they established themselves in Tokyo, they 
began to get tips and information on war crimes, which were committed.  These came from a 
variety of sources and often from those disaffected by the Imperial Japanese government or the 
individuals they named.
193
  Sanders was not there to prosecute people, as he was far more 
interested in learning what advances the Japanese had made in biological warfare and the United 
States government was also eager to find the mastermind behind it all, General Ishii Shiro who 
was in hiding.  For several months after the war, Ishii was able to elude authorities through 
bribery and schemes, including faking his own death.
194
  It was not long before the Sanders’ 
investigation tracked him down to his home in Chiba, but they did not put him in jail, allowing 
him to stay at his house, albeit under house arrest.  In the initial interviews, Ishii asserted the 
same claims as Naito, that he had not conducted research on humans and that only defensive 
research was done.
195
  Most of Ishii’s subordinates were interviewed as well, including the 
infamous Kitano who was one time commander of Unit 731 when Ishii was removed from 
command for a short time.  Chinese forces captured Kitano at the end of the war; however, the 
United States broke him out of jail, put him on a US Army airplane and with the compliance of 
the Chiang Kai Shek government, rushed Kitano back to Japan.
196
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Arvo Thompson, a military investigator, placed in charge of examining Ishii but as with 
Naito, gained little during his initial interviews.  Reports were coming in that Ishii was not as 
benevolent as he was trying to present himself and as late as 4 October 1946, anonymous sources 
were accusing Ishii of running a biological warfare research unit.  The 4 October report stated 
that Ishii conducted his research in the suburbs of Harbin and it accuses Ishii of conducting 
experiments on Allied POWs.
197
  The more they spoke, the more information Ishii was willing to 
give, believing that Japan was ahead of the United States in biological warfare research.
198
  In 
May 1947, MacArthur permitted Soviet officers to speak to Ishii.  MacArthur had asked 
permission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff who instructed him to have Ishii and the other scientists 
prepped for the interview.  Ishii and his family were also instructed to not divulge any important 
information regarding biological warfare and to not let the Soviets know how friendly the 
Americans had been.  The final stipulation was that an American officer was with Ishii and the 
other men interviewed at all times.
199
  It is clear from this reaction that the United States did not 
want the Soviet Union getting its hands on any of Japan’s biological warfare research out of fear 
they would use the information to advance Soviet biological warfare research programs.  The 
Soviet investigators were only allowed to hold to interviews with Ishii.  The Soviets cited their 
desire to see Ishii prosecuted as a war criminal but their true reasons were not so altruistic.  The 
Soviets were covering up for their desire to gain any useful information that might give them an 
advantage against the United States in any future conflict.  The Soviet Union also saw Ishii and 
his compatriots as useful propaganda material.  The idea being to expose what they did and 
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embarrass the United States for not bringing the men to justice as soon as they were caught.
200
  
Such propaganda could be useful in a cold war where the combatants exchanged words more 
than bullets.  For the United States, the Russians also proved to be useful, because they were able 
to use the threat of bringing in Russian interrogators in order to scare information out of the 
Japanese scientists as Sanders had effectively done with Naito.  The Japanese were far more 
afraid of the Russians than the Americans and not without good reason.  The United States was 
not concerned with prosecuting the men of Unit 731, because national security was deemed more 
important than bringing to justice the scientists who had murdered thousands. 
The Khabarovsk Trials 
The Soviet Union would get its propaganda in the form of the Khabarovsk Trials, held 
over six days from 25 to 31 December 1949.  There were twelve defendants and though Ishii was 
named at the trial as the leader of Japan’s biological warfare program, he was not put on trial in 
absentia.
201
  Emperor Hirohito was also blamed for the human rights abuses and was accused of 
ordering the formation of Unit 731, but like Ishii, he was not tried in absentia.
202
  At the time, 
there was very little coverage in the United States of the trial, due to the location of the trial in 
the city of Khabarovsk in an isolated region of Siberia.  Had the Soviets wanted the trial to have 
a bigger impact they could have held it in Moscow and put the Emperor on trial in absentia 
which would have certainly created a stir.  The exact reason why they held the trial in such a 
remote area is not entirely clear but the timing was likely due to the conflict brewing in 1949 
over several hundred thousand Japanese soldiers held in the Soviet Union.
203
  The United States 
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asserted that the Soviet Union was trying to distract from the criticism of its treatment and 
detention of Japanese soldiers.  The Soviet Union accused America of hiding and suppressing 
information about Japan’s war crimes out of a desire to develop biological weapons 
themselves.
204
  Ironically, both accusations were correct.  Furthermore, the information and 
accusations presented in the trials were surprisingly accurate.  At the time, the United States 
officially wrote off most of the proceedings as false and propaganda, and while the six-day trial 
was meant as propaganda, a lot of the information the trial revealed was later determined to be 
factual by researchers.  Going into the trial, each of the defendants was assumed guilty and their 
defense attorneys admitted this.  The show trial was really to determine what sentences they 
should receive.
205
  The defendants in the case received unusually light sentences ranging from 
two to twenty years hard labor and it is likely that they exchanged information for leniency.
206
  
All the defendants but one returned to Japan by the mid-1950s; the one who did not return killed 
himself months before his release.
207
 
Another incident, which points back to the American cover-up as well as the fledgling 
Japanese government’s complicity in the cover-up after the war, was known as the Taikoku Bank 
massacre.  In 1948, a man walked into a branch of the Taikoku Bank in Tokyo.  He identified 
himself as a member of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and declared that there was an 
epidemic in the area and that General Headquarters, which was the office of General MacArthur, 
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had sent him to deal with the outbreak.
208
  He stated he had been sent with medicine to protect 
against the epidemic, and that the manager should gather all the employees.  After the manager 
complied with the order, the Ministry worker imposter then revealed the medicine, inserted a 
pipette into, put the liquid in a teacup, and demonstrated the particular way it should be drunk 
which was with the tongue out and quickly so it would go faster down the throat.  Then he 
poured the same liquid into sixteen cups for each person present with the same pipette, which all 
the employees drank.  Twelve died and four survived, and the man made off with only 181, 850 
yen, not a considerable amount of money considering it was supposed to be a bank robbery.  
This troubled police because they did not believe robbery was the real motive.
209
  Samples of the 
poison used to kill the victims were sent to Keio University, which determined it to be acetone 
cyanohydrin.
210
  Only the Noborito Army Research Center in Kawaski produced this poison and 
it was highly specialized because it did not kill instantly.  Because of the location of its 
production, the public could not obtain the poison.  The Noborito lab developed the poison, but 
Ishii’s Unit 731 tested it and this meant that only someone who either had worked for the 
Noborito lab or had handled it at Unit 731 could have obtained it.
211
  In one of his interviews 
with American investigators Ishii made a comment about the Teikoku Bank Incident when he 
said, “I have a feeling that one of my men did it.”212  The police began to make a list of suspects 
connected with Unit 731 when suddenly the police claimed to have arrested a person who fit the 
descriptions given by eyewitnesses.   
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The man the police arrested was an artist named Hirasawa Sadamichi and after intense 
interrogation and an attempted suicide, he confessed to the crime, which in Japan at the time was 
proof of guilt.
213
  Hirasawa’s confession has raised questions about his innocence because of the 
insistencies between his story and the testimony from survivors.  He never mentions using a 
pipette and the word used to describe the teacup was koppu, which does not mean teacup in 
Japanese, but western style drinking-glass.  Hirasawa also suffered from a condition known as 
Korsakoff Syndrome which causes one to have irregular memory loss, which causes the sufferer 
to try to compensate, by making up false memories.
214
  The final piece of evidence which 
suggests Hirasawa was innocent was that the four survivors stated Hirasawa did not look like the 
man who poisoned them, not to mention that Hirasawa could not have had access to acetone 
cyanohydrin as he had no connections to the Noborito lab.  Tokyo University solved this last 
problem when they also examined the poison and conveniently found it to be potassium cyanide, 
which is far more accessible.
215
  Hirasawa was convicted and sentenced to death, but the 
sentence was never carried out and in 1987, Hirasawa died in prison despite the efforts of a small 
group of activists to free him.
216
  The connections to Unit 731 are very compelling, especially 
given Ishii’s statement.  However, to convict a member of Unit 731 in open court of the murders 
would shatter the veil of secrecy placed over the existence of the unit. 
Until 1948, Unit 731 members did not have official immunity.  Investigators made 
promises of immunity and orders not to prosecute them issued but these were not as binding as 
an official internal declaration.  13 March 1948, General MacArthur received instructions to 
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document immunity for the Unit 731 scientists in exchange for biological warfare information.
217
  
Barenblatt stated it eloquently when he said, “the ‘Secret of Secrets’ of Imperial Japan had 
become America’s big secret.”  The United States government had committed itself to their 
position of covering up the crimes of Japanese scientists, and not just the military scientist, but 
also the civilians and the universities and pharmaceutical companies in Japan, because they were 
associated with the crimes.  The Japanese government would take the same stance and 
throughout the rest of the 20
th
 century would deny that human experiments ever took place.   
Rockets, Biology, and the Cold War 
 The response to Germany’s war crimes was similar to the response to Japan’s war crimes.  
Many of the top Nazis either killed themselves or escaped, but many were brought to justice.  
Some of the top Japanese war criminals who survived the war or did not commit suicide, like 
Tojo Hideki, were sentenced to die or to life in prison just like their Nazi counter parts.  
Nevertheless, many Nazi and Japanese scientists were too valuable.  Nazis such as Wernher von 
Braun, a rocket scientist made famous by his work with the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and Eric Traub, a scientist who worked on programs which sought to 
develop weaponize animal diseases, were brought to the United States to continue their research.  
Some of these men were accused of war crimes such as using slave labor, yet they were given 
immunity in exchange for their work in the US after the war.  Officially, the process of bringing 
Nazi scientists to the United States was known as Operation Paperclip.
218
  Operation Paperclip 
was the largest and longest running operation involving Nazis and continued until 1973.
219
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 Operation Paperclip began before the war ended when it was realized the Soviet Union 
posed the next great threat to the United States.
220
  This was the excuse often used for justifying 
the immunity given to Nazi and Japanese doctors.  There is a great deal of truth in this statement 
as the national security of the US was placed above all else.  Government officials, like the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, knew that the Soviets were actively pursuing German and Japanese scientists.  
Some of these scientists, like Wernher von Braun, worked for NASA to develop rocket 
technology and eventually a way to reach the Moon.  Others were taken to the Edgewood 
Arsenal to work with poison gas and other chemical agents like the hallucinogen, lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD).
221
  In one case, a former service member named James Stanley volunteered 
in 1958 to test the effectiveness of clothing designed to protect against chemical weapons.
222
  
Without his knowledge, he was actually given LSD to test the way the human body and brain 
react.
223
  Stanley was eventually discharged because of personality changes he suffered from the 
effects of LSD and sued the federal government on the claim that his fourth amendment rights 
had been violated.  His case made it to the US Supreme Court, which decided he did not have a 
claim to compensation.
224
  Stanley was not the only person to undergo human experiments at the 
Edgewood arsenal, which tested on thousands of people.
225
 
 The United States conducted human experiments in a more limited fashion than those 
conducted by German and Japan in terms of the number of victims.  While the victims in the US 
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are counted in thousands, the Japanese experimented on tens of thousands and possibly more.  
The exact number will never be known and almost all of those used by the Japanese for testing 
died.  The purpose of tests with drugs like LSD and poison chemicals like mustard gas was to 
more efficiently wage war.
226
  The United States conducted its tests over a much longer period, 
beginning in 1922 and continuing at least into the 1960s while the Japanese operated from 1932 
to 1945.
227
  The United States showed such great interest in Japan’s program for two reasons.  
The first was during World War II when Japan was thought to be further ahead since most of the 
experiments conducted by the US were done with chemical and not biological agents.  The 
second reason was to keep as much information on the development of biological weapons out of 
Soviet hands as was possible.  At the end of the war, it was unknown what advances the Japanese 
had made, so it was of paramount importance to secure the scientists as quickly as possible.  The 
same reasons applied to the Nazi scientists as well.  The fact that the Germans and the Japanese 
had conducted human experiments was not a reason for pause because the United States had 
been doing the same thing in a more limited fashion.  That the Germans and Japanese had 
conducted human experiments was only more reason to capture them and obtain any information 
they might possess. 
End of the Secret 
 The United States’ cover-up is well documented.  Many of the official internal documents, 
which ordered the cover-up, have been declassified.  However, the government of Japan often 
resists investigations into its human experiments activities and still refuses to apologize for what 
it did before and during World War II.  It was determined after the war by the Sanders and 
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Thompson investigations that Unit 731 had obtained little knowledge the United States did not 
already have or could not easily obtain through more benign methods of study.  In many cases, 
Japan’s research was useless from a purely scientific point of view.  Their research into frostbite, 
for example, was without purpose considering that the method of treatment was already known.  
By the time, the United States realized Japan was actually behind in biological warfare research, 
it was already committed to the cover-up and continued to hide Japanese war crimes out of a 
desire to avoid embarrassment. 
World War II was the largest and bloodiest war in history and the Pacific theater of war is 
often remembered for its shear ferocity.  Battles like Iwo Jima were fought with extremely high 
casualty rates and relatively low numbers of prisoners taken by either side.  The blame for this 
does not rest solely with one country or group of people.  Blame is placed, at least in part, on the 
racist ideologies, which many people in the United States and Japan held.  For the typical US 
citizen, the Japanese soldier was at times a bloodthirsty super man and at other times an inferior, 
ape-like creature that was as brutal as he was cunning.  The Japanese as a whole were viewed 
through the spectrum of previous years of fear that “yellow tide” threatened to wash over the 
civilized West.  For many Japanese, the war was for Japan’s rightful place in the world against a 
spiritually unclean and demonic horde, which sought the repression of Japan.  Many Japanese 
were taught that they could help the Asian people by bringing them the enlightening values of 
Japanese culture and leadership.  The racist ideologies of both sides left little room for mercy 
when World War II finally broke out but at its end, the hatred on a national scale dissipated.  
There were still hatreds held by many Americans and Japanese, but the two nations quickly 
became close allies as the Cold War necessitated the need for cooperation.  Unlike what the 
75 
 
Japanese told their citizens, American soldiers did not rape women and eat children.  Americans 
soon found the Japanese were far more diversified in thought and once the war was declared over, 
many surrendered peacefully after having grown tired of a war, which had left so many dead and 
a country in ruins.
228
  Both sides held misconceptions, which were found to be untrue and not 
needed after the war.  The American demon transformed into a friend and Japan began one of the 
greatest economic recoveries in history.  In the United States, the fear of the “Red Menace” 
replaced the horror of the “Yellow Peril.”  The desire to protect the United States by any means 
necessary was similar to the desire by the Japanese scientists to develop weapons to use to 
accomplish Japan’s goals.  Racism and nationalism combined to drive the process of human 
exploitation forward and justify the actions of scientists. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The connections gained during the war paid off handsomely after the war for many 
members of the Ishii network.  The Green Cross, a pharmaceutical company founded by Naito 
Ryoichi, Futagi Hideo, and Kitano Masaji, was a huge success after the war.
229
  The company is 
famous for being one of the major companies in the Japanese economic boom after the war.  It is 
also infamous for introducing the AIDS virus to Japan when it ignored standard safety 
procedures for blood transfusions.  Other Unit 731 members went on to success as well in other 
companies.  Takeda Pharmaceutical Company, the Hayakawa Medical Company, the S.J. 
Company, Ltd., and the faculties of Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Osaka University, 
Kanazawa University, Showa University of Pharmacology, Nagoya Prefecture Medical 
University, Osaka Municipal University’s School of Medicine, and Juntendo University along 
with several others employed former members of Unit 731 after the war.
230
  The Japanese 
government employed its share of Ishii graduates, including a chief of the Entomology section of 
the Health and Welfare Ministry’s Preventive Health Research Laboratories and a director of 
Japan’s National Cancer Center, as well as a president of Japan’s Medical Association.231  There 
was also a surgeon general of Japan’s newly minted Defense Force, and the list goes on.232  It is 
also noteworthy to mention that every director of the Japan National Institute of Health, 
beginning with its creation in May 1947 until 1983 (with only one exception), served in a 
biological warfare unit.  Many Unit 731 men held other important positions in society and won 
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many awards and achievements, while the lower workers, technicians, and soldiers melted back 
into Japanese society.  Ishii Shiro never faced trial and died in quiet retirement of throat cancer in 
1959, having lived out his remaining years on a stipend provided by the Japanese government 
because of his rank of Lieutenant General at the end of the war.  What the highest officer to the 
lowest technician held in common was the environment and ideology under which they operated.  
The ultra-nationalist philosophy of the Japanese empire justified actions that would normally be 
reprehensible.  Racism stated that it was the purpose of their victims to die for the benefit of their 
Japanese masters. 
 While Ishii’s Unit 731 was certainly one of the largest of many biological warfare 
research units, with many of those other units connected to Unit 731 to varying degrees of 
dependency or autonomy, it was not the only unit actively conducting human experiments.  
Many other units, which conducted human experiments, have remained hidden due to their small 
size or lack of records.  For years, it was difficult to find much information about the Unit 731 
network due to the official cover-up by the United States.  Ishii, Kitano, Naito, Wakamatsu and 
many others held their silence, except for when they spoke to United States investigators 
immediately after the war in exchange for immunity.  For some, what they had done was 
shameful and in 1993 at the traveling Unit 731 Exhibition, a small number of men and women 
finally broke their silence and provided some of the best firsthand accounts available to 
researchers.  For all but a very few, their crimes went unpunished.  It was only thanks to the 
dogged research of people like Peter Williams and David Wallace, the book by Sheldon Harris, 
and the work of many Chinese and Japanese scholars and researchers, and some citizen activists 
in Japan that the story of Unit 731 has become known.  In spite of all the evidence currently 
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available, the Japanese government, for many years after the war, was reluctant to acknowledge 
that Unit 731 existed.  So far, there has been no compensation to the victims but there has been a 
certain amount of progress in cleaning up some of the hundreds of thousands of chemical 
weapons, which were left in China following the chaotic retreat of the Japanese military.  
However, these weapons still represent a danger to anyone unfortunate enough to stumble across 
them, because the weapons are still as deadly now as they were during the war. 
 It is important to remember that the biological warfare research units, so called “water 
purification units,” were not the only actors in this tale.  They were but a portion of the larger 
machine.  The heart of this machine was the universities and scientific community in Japan, 
which bred the men and women, who carried out the crimes.  The universities and governments 
provided the motivation and justification through racist ideology for murder by telling them their 
actions would further the goals of the Japanese nation.  Places of higher learning, such as Kyoto 
University, participated in the crimes and it is known now that human experiments took place on 
the mainland, in army medical hospitals and universities.  The story of the murders that took 
place at Kyushu University in which eight American aviators were dissected and then consumed 
exemplifies such experiments.  The discovery of human skulls and bones in the heart of Tokyo, 
skulls, which came from Japan’s colonies, represent the exploitation of millions of Chinese, 
Koreans, Manchurians, and many others.  The scientist of the biological warfare research units 
published their experiments and findings in public, scientific journals in which the only change 
they would make would be to replace the word human, with monkey.  For a scientist reading 
such an article, it would not be difficult to figure out what it was really about.  They might 
recognize the author’s name as being a member of Unit 731, as many of these men were well 
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known in the scientific community, or an astute reader might realize that the species of monkey 
had been left out, something that simply was not done in a professionally written scientific report.  
Universities were actively involved in Unit 731 activities and showed videos of experiments 
conducted at the unit, as attested to by firsthand accounts. 
At naval hospitals across the Japanese Empire, United States service members were 
tortured in experiments or used for surgical practice.  These hospitals were part of the larger 
network as well.  This giant machine dedicated to the exploitation of humans viewed as inferior 
did not just include the military and not all the people in its employ were military personnel.  It 
was inextricably linked to the civilian sphere as it was seen by many at the time that it was the 
duty of every Japanese citizen to work towards attaining Japan’s divinely given and scientifically 
supported right of ruling over Asia.  The various ultra-nationalist groups in Japan pushed the 
country to expand.  They believed the Japanese were a divine race whose right was to rule over 
Asia by creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  This sphere was to be enforced by 
any means necessary, even if that meant using Ishii’s biological weapons.  Ishii asserted that the 
combination of conventional warfare and science would make Japan victorious.  One piece of 
propaganda which typified the attitude of many ultra-nationalists after World War II started 
came from an article in a monthly magazine called the Bungei Shunjuu which stated, “The color 
of purification is faint red, tinged with the pinkness of blood: it is the color of life itself.  It is this 
very warmth of life which has made the cherry blossom the symbol of the Yamato spirit.”233  
White represents purity and red represents the blood and morality of the Japanese people.  The 
pink cherry blossom represents the melding of pure white and blood red.  The cherry blossom 
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became a symbol in song and art of the cleansing of the national soul through the spilling of 
blood upon the battlefield.  
The United States realized during the war the danger Japan’s biological weapons program 
presented, especially in the event of an invasion of the home islands.  This invasion of Japan 
never came to fruition.  The use of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced an 
end to the war.  But in the aftermath of World War II and with a cold war looming with the 
Soviet Union, the United States scrambled to obtain whatever secrets Japan might have 
discovered in the nearly fifteen years they had spent studying biological weapons.  It soon 
became apparent during the war that Japan had actually used these weapons in China with many 
reports confirming this.  The Japanese managed to carry out one of the most devastating 
biological attacks in history in Yunnan Province, which killed an estimated two hundred 
thousand people by creating a cholera epidemic.  When General MacArthur arrived, one of the 
people in his entourage was Lieutenant Colonel Murray Sanders.  He was one of the first 
investigators into Japan’s biological weapons program.  As soon as he stepped off the ship, the 
now infamous Naito Ryoichi of Unit 731 fame confronted him.  At first Naito was hesitant to 
disclose information due to the serious nature of Naito’s crimes and the war crimes trials already 
underway.  Naito, who spoke English, acted as an intermediary between Sanders and the other 
Unit 731 members.  At this time, Ishii was in hiding and had faked his own death, having a 
funeral held to solidify the story.  After a few months of Naito’s delaying, Sanders was finally 
able to get more information out of him by threatening to bring in Soviet investigators who were 
not known for being friendly.  The harshest treatment Ishii received was when he was placed 
under house arrest by investigators shortly after they discovered where he was hiding.  The 
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investigators made deals with Ishii in exchange for information and General Douglas MacArthur 
issued orders not to prosecute any of the Unit 731 members or others in their network for war 
crimes.  In 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially gave the okay to offer immunity in exchange 
for information.   
The interests of the nation were considered to be above justice for the victims because the 
Soviet Union was trying to obtain the same information about Japan’s biological weapons 
program for use in their own program, which was probably true.  In the end, Japan had little to 
offer that the United States had not already discovered in its own bio-weapons research center at 
Fort Detrick.  By the time this was realized it was too late and to back out would only embarrass 
the United States government and prove Soviet accusations of a cover up, true.  For their part, 
the Soviet Union did prosecute some of the members of Unit 731 and the Kwantung Army that 
they had captured.  In a six-day trial known as the Khabarovsk Trials, the Soviet Union tried and 
convicted twelve people for conducting human experiments.  All but one were released, the only 
one to not return home to Japan killed himself just months before his release, in what may have 
been a sign of remorse for the crimes he committed.  The trial was mostly for show although it 
was held in the backwater industrial city of Khabarovsk which meant it received little media 
attentions.  Despite this, many of the accusations would prove to be quite accurate and it has 
remained a significant source of information on Japan’s human experiments.   
For the United States’ scientists and investigators, the human subjects of the experiments 
seemed to matter little, what was important was the obtaining of information that might help the 
country in the event of war with the Soviet Union.  The United States conducted human 
experiments of its own from 1922 until the 1960s, which helps explain why they had little issue 
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with offering immunity to people who had also conducted human experiments.  The US military 
used men like Master Sergeant James Stanley to test chemical weapons and drugs at the 
Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland.
234
  The tests permanently damaged Stanley physically and 
emotionally, resulting in the loss of his career in the military and the loss of his marriage.
235
  The 
Supreme Court ruled Stanley’s rights had not been violated after they considered his lawsuit 
against the government.
236
  The belief that the needs of the nation came before the individual had 
allowed scientists in the United States to experiment on humans, just as the scientists in Japan 
believed that their countries needs came first.  Racism was not the only factor, but it played a 
huge role in the justifications for experiments for many scientists like Ishii Shiro.  Most of 
Japan’s victims were Chinese and many people in the United States held strong racist attitudes 
towards non-whites, so there was no real moral conflict with using the information from 
Japanese experiments in the eyes of a government preparing for a future war.  The Soviet Union 
was also very active in trying to capture Japanese scientists to bolster its own biological weapons 
programs. 
Along with the United States and Japan, Nazi Germany also conducted human 
experiments at concentration camps like Auschwitz, Dachau, and Dora.
237
  One of the most 
infamous of these doctors of murder was Dr. Josef Mengele.  He had a particular affinity for 
studying twins but this was because of his own scientific curiosity into genetics and the nature of 
twins.  In this respect, he and others were similar to Japan’s Unit 731.  They conducted 
experiments they considered interesting and fun but held little or no scientific value.  The Nazis 
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had a biological weapons program and conducted experiments, but many of their experiments 
were focused on concepts of race and racial hygiene.  Far more important to the Nazis was the 
elimination of people considered undesirable.  These groups included Jews, Gypsies, 
homosexuals, mentally challenged persons, and anyone considered anti-social or political 
dissidents.  After World War II, during the Nuremburg Trials, many Nazis were rounded up and 
punished.  Many of the Nazis prosecuted were either high profile leaders of the Nazi party or 
individuals who committed crimes but had nothing to offer the Allies.  Like the Japanese 
scientists of Unit 731, many Nazi scientists, such as Wernher von Braun, received immunity 
from any involvement in crimes against humanity.  The United States’ first priority was gaining 
any knowledge enemy scientists held in order to have an advantage of the Soviet Union in the 
event of possible future conflict. 
Like Mengele and other Nazi scientists, the Japanese scientists did not just experiment for 
practical reasons.  Often the motivation for these experiments was scientific curiosity or just 
because it was fun.  For example, the Japanese did experiments where they would see how long 
it took a person to die from electrical shock.
238
  They would change voltage and amperage and 
record the results.  In one such experiment, the victim simply burned to death.
239
  Victims would 
die in extreme agony for the curiosity of the scientist and the tests were pointless from a purely 
scientific point of view because it was well known that electricity could kill.  Other experiments 
would involve removing a victim’s hands and then sowing them back onto the body but on the 
opposite side, with the left hand on the right arm and the right hand on the left arm.
240
  Other 
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experiments had a defined purpose, such as when Japanese scientists attempted blood 
transfusions using horse blood.
241
  The scientist conducted experiments with radiation, as well as 
the infamous frostbite experiments for which a special building was constructed at Ping Fan so 
they could be done all year round.   
Ultra-nationalist Japanese viewed non-Japanese as inferior and often described non-
Japanese as animals or people with dirty, inferior souls.  In the view of the Japanese scientists, 
the maruta they murdered were little more than logs whose only value was in the potential for 
important scientific discovery.  The racist attitudes of the scientists informed their ability to 
murder.  They viewed their subjects as precious scientific material, as objects of study, but not as 
humans on a level equal to themselves.  It was the “proper place” of the maruta to be used as the 
mighty Yamato race saw fit.  If experiments on humans could advance the goals of Japan, then it 
was considered necessary to conduct those experiments and the victims deserved to die.  There 
are some examples of Japanese showing remorse for their victims, more notably among the non-
scientists, including suicides because of guilt, but these instances were rare.  For the most part 
the victims were viewed as scientific material and were treated as such.  Each prisoner had a 
number and was only kept alive for as long as they were considered useful, which was generally 
just a few months.  These attitudes spoke to a wider problem with Japan’s scientific community 
of the time.  These men were raised in an atmosphere, which considered non-Japanese to be non-
human or sub-human at best.  This was typified by the use of the word maruta to describe the 
prisoners at Ping Fan.  The term maruta labeled the victims as being non-human, no more than 
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objects or lab rats.  By stripping an individual of their humanity, it became easier for scientists to 
murder and the more they murdered the easier it became. 
For Yuasa Ken, the first time he killed he says it was difficult, but he would go on to 
dissect fourteen people and he said every time it got easier, and when he raped the comfort 
women in his mind he was just paying for services.
242
  Nakagawa Yonezo characterized the 
attitude of Ishii and many other doctors for whom ultra-nationalism was a major driving force.  
Nakagawa was a student at Kyoto Imperial University in 1945 when an army doctor who was the 
instructor told him and his class, “medicine is not for healing the sick and injured…medicine 
itself must become a weapon.”243  Ishii shared this same view of medicine.  For him and others 
medicine was a weapon to be used to further the goals of the nation.  Biological weapons, Ishii 
believed, were the ultimate expression of this.  They were a weapon that could kill 
indiscriminately, silently, and without ever being seen.  Biological weapons cause fear and 
anxiety in the enemy, killing soldier and civilian alike as the disease spreads without mercy.  It 
would also feed his own ego and sense of self-importance, allowing him to project his own sense 
of power and control because he was the driving personality behind Japan’s biological weapons 
program. 
From the inception of Japan’s biological warfare research program in 1931 to its end in 
1945, Ishii was one of the principal actors.  The program would have survived without him as 
others were driven onward by their ultra-nationalist beliefs.  The program was part of a larger 
machine of human exploitation though this does not diminish its significance or the significance 
of Ishii in the carrying out of the aforementioned crimes.  The legacy of Unit 731 is a sordid one, 
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with their scars left across China, Manchukuo, and the Pacific nations and anywhere else they or 
others like them operated.  The unit is still a source of contention between China and Japan.  The 
Japanese government would like to forget and move on from the unit’s history while many 
Chinese believe that at the very least an official apology is owed.  Such an apology has not been 
forthcoming.  Neither have reparations for the families of the victims been forthcoming which 
was not the case with Germany who paid large sums of reparations.   
Viewing Ishii’s Unit 731 in the larger context of Japan’s Imperial war machine does not 
diminish its role.  If anything, it enhances the role he and his unit played by exposing the 
network Ishii built across Japan.  Placing Unit 731 into the context of Japan’s racist views of the 
early 20
th
 century is important to understanding the motivations, which drove seemingly normal 
people to commit crimes against humanity.  It is necessary to view Unit 731 under the proper 
context to gain a fuller understanding of the crimes committed.  What Japan did was not unusual 
when viewed alongside the actions of Germany and the United States.  World War II is 
sometimes described as a race war and the description fits when one views the attitudes held by 
Japan, Germany, and the United States.  Germany was motivated by its hatred of Jews and the 
desire to create a master race.  The United States viewed Japan as a dangerously cunning, 
monolithic society of sub-humans whose only goal was the destruction of white civilization.  
Imperial Japan believed the Yamato race was the true master race, which needed to be purified 
with blood in the struggle to obtain its rightful position through war.  World War II was fueled 
by racial hatred and violent nationalism, and this gave justification for the human experiments 
perpetrated by Unit 731. 
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